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Abstract
The provision of subsidised workspace for small enterprises has been a public sector concern in many developed economies
since the 1960s. In recent years, the focus of economic development initiatives has shifted away from supply side initiatives,
such as fiscal incentives and the direct provision of premises, towards a consideration of the collective provision of
infrastructure and services, in order to meet demands of businesses and workers in cities where there is already strong
demand and growth. As well as this shift from supply- to demand-side initiatives, there has been a change in the political
ideological approach to land and property development, away from public sector direct provision and funding, to place greater
onus on the private sector to deliver development, infrastructure and services. The introduction of ‘affordable workspace’
planning policies by local authorities in London from the early 2000s is part of this shift – building on more established key
worker and affordable housing policies.
This paper evaluates the success of affordable workspace planning policies in thirteen mixed use schemes in London, from the
perspectives of developers and workspace providers, who are responsible for delivering and managing the affordable workspace.
First, it finds that the perspective of the developer, in particular whether it sees affordable workspace policy as (a) an opportunity, (b)
a ‘tool’ to secure planning permission or (c) a burden, is mostly influenced by the way in which the affordable workspace emerged
within the proposal. Developers’ perspectives and the success of their partnerships with workspace providers are critical to the
successful delivery of affordable workspace within the scheme. Second, the findings show that ‘affordable workspace’ is difficult to
define and deliver, with different interpretations used by delivery partners and the ability of workspace providers to deliver
affordability depends critically on their organisational model. Finally, the research shows that although there are clear benefits of the
policy for artists and small, creative industry businesses, it is not benefiting low-value manufacturers or small family-run retail and
service businesses, nor is it generally benefiting start-ups. The implications of policy outcomes for economic development are
considered; overall the beneficial impacts are limited. The research concludes that the predominant model of affordable workspace
policy being promoted in London will fail to meet the aspirations of policy makers, with the limited success of policy further
compounded by the global recession of the late-2000s. Alternative or complementary strategies are discussed.
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1.1. Introduction
The provision of subsidised workspace for small
enterprises has been a public sector concern in many
developed economies since the 1960s, and has been part
of a trend in economic development which focused on
supply-side initiatives, such as fiscal incentives and the
direct provision of premises. The public sector had its
biggest impact in the UK during the 1980s and 1990s,
through the direct provision and funding of managed
workspaces (see Section 1.2). Since then, there has been
a shift in focus of economic development policies
towards a consideration of the collective provision of
infrastructure, workforce housing and services, in order
to meet the demands of businesses and their workers in
areas where there is already strong demand and growth
(Jonas, While, & Gibbs, 2010; Raco, 2008). The
emphasis is no longer on promoting inter-regional
equity, but on increasing the competitiveness of places,
through the attraction of highly skilled, young profes-
sional ‘creative’ workers to key centres of production
(Cheshire & Gordon, 1996, 1998; Peck, 2005; Raco,
2008; Turok, 2004; Ward, 1990).
This re-focus on successful cities took place as
globalisation took hold, much mass production moved
overseas, and it became clear that the UK’s economic
strength lay in nurturing smaller industries, niche
producers and supporting ‘new economy’ businesses.
To the surprise of some, globalisation promoted rather
than undermined the benefits of agglomeration (or
‘clustering’) (Asheim, Cooke, & Martin, 2006; Porter,
1998; Sassen, 1991; Scott, 1998, 2001). New theories of
clustering suggested that businesses’ competitive
advantage in the new economy is enhanced by the
healthy competition between businesses found in a
cluster (Porter, 1990), as well as the collaboration and
social networking between them and other agencies
within it (Gordon & McCann, 2000; Keeble &
Wilkinson, 2000; Maskell, 2001). Most influential
has been the writing of Florida (2002, 2005) who argued
that businesses in the new economy make location
decisions based on the availability of human capital.
This influenced the recognition of demand-side
considerations of businesses and workers residing in the
city, rather than an exclusive focus on supply-side
policies. Furthermore, these issues have become more
pertinent as successful economic centres mature, the
cost of collective provision rises and threatens the
competitiveness of firms operating in these spaces
(Jonas et al., 2010). In the late 1990s and early 2000s inLondon, there was a real concern that property values
were rising to such an extent that small businesses were
being pushed out (Ancer Spa, 2006; New Economics
Foundation, 2004). Also, the lack of supply of land for
housing, coupled with a changing economic base,
meant that there was increasing pressure from central
Government on planners to release employment land for
housing and mixed use (see DETR, 2000a, 2000b).
This, coupled with the pressure of market forces, led to
a reduction in employment land and increase in residual
employment land prices. Also, the emphasis on mixed
communities meant there was a greater acceptance of
mixed-use development on former employment land,
again impacting on land and property prices for
employment use.
It was in this context that policies on affordable
workspace started to emerge, building on already
accepted policies on affordable and key worker
housing. It was perhaps expected that introducing a
policy on affordable workspace would compensate for
the loss of naturally affordable workspace on protected
employment land. Some local authorities, such as
Hackney on the fringe of the city of London, had been
experiencing such acute pressures as a result of rising
property values that they started to develop their own
policy responses. These local initiatives were reinforced
through the Mayor of London’s call for more affordable
workspace in the capital (GLA, 2004a, 2004b, 2008).
Other local authorities in less high value areas are using
affordable workspace policy as an economic develop-
ment tool to stimulate regeneration through attracting
creative industries (Ferm, 2011). The policies that have
emerged are modelled on affordable housing: they use
planning obligations (Section 106 agreements) to
legally require developers of residential or mixed use
schemes on employment land to provide and subsidise
affordable workspace on site, funded through the profits
on the sale of residential accommodation (see Section
1.4 for a further discussion of Section 106).
In this new policy context, the local authority retains
an interest through its role as planning authority, but the
space is delivered by developers through new build
schemes, and is operated and managed by workspace
providers. This follows a change in the political
ideological approach to land and property development,
placing greater onus on the private sector to deliver
development, infrastructure and services. As a result,
private property developers are now the predominant
supplier of buildings in Britain, whereas in the late
1970s, they supplied only half of new construction
orders (Henneberry & Rowley, 2000). As Section 1.2
shows, the evidence on the impact of managed
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which undermined support for subsidy from the public
purse. Although the affordable workspace model means
that public sector money is not used directly to subsidise
premises, as with all economic development initiatives,
justification has to be made that subsidy is ‘worth it’. In
an age of austerity, this is even more important.
This paper therefore evaluates the success of
planning policies that rely on the private sector to
deliver affordable workspace through mixed use
schemes, using data from an analysis of thirteen case
study developments in London. It asks four questions:
(1) What are developers’ and workspace providers’
perspectives on affordable workspace and its delivery
through the planning system? (2) How do their
organisational models, priorities and motivations affect
the way affordable workspace policy is working in
practice? (3) What are the outcomes in practice and
why? (4) What are the implications for planning policy?
The National Planning Policy Framework (DCLG,
2012) introduced a requirement for local authorities to
demonstrate the financial viability of their local plans,
and thus requires a better understanding of the pressures
and constraints developers face. However, we know
surprisingly little about the development industry, in
particular whether developers see themselves as
‘partners of the state’ in delivering objectives or what
their relationship with planners is like (Adams,
Croudace, & Tiesdell, 2012). This paper responds to
the call for ‘‘a more thorough understanding of the
development industry, and particularly of the cultural
differences between different types of developer, as a
pre-requisite for more effective policy-making’’
(Adams et al., 2012: 17). It also turns our attention
to the other key partner in delivering affordable
workspace through planning policy – the workspace
provider – of which even less is known.
Developers’ profit drive and interest in the ‘exchange
value’ of buildings as opposed to their ‘use value’,
which is traditionally the interest of occupiers (Logan &
Molotch, 1987), means that we might expect affordable
workspace to be viewed by developers as yet another
‘exaction’ by local authorities on private developers.
However, in their revised edition, Logan and Molotch
(2007) propose that Florida’s creative class thesis has
challenged this common dichotomy by showing that
residents themselves are an engine of development. If
developers are to make money and maximise the
exchange value of buildings, then they have to consider
the components that influence their use value too:
‘‘Developers and city officials believe that signals of
creativity, like art galleries, espresso bars and foreignmagazine stands, can generate rent and revenues. The
‘arts’ – in the most general sense of the word – have
become a conscious strategy for growth’’ (Logan &
Molotch, 2007:xix). Therefore, in relation to affordable
workspace policy, we can speculate that developers may
not be reluctant partners in delivering public good,
where a state requirement is simply detracting from the
exchange value of land. Rather, affordable workspace
could be seen as another part of the ‘smart growth’
mantra and ‘‘may turn out to be just another smoke
screen for making more money, now with arts
organisations as valued coalition ‘partners’’’ (p.xx).
This paper extends this idea to workspace providers,
asking whether they operate as agents of the state,
responsible for delivering affordability and the state’s
social objectives or whether they operate more as
coalition partners with developers in the delivery of
growth objectives.
Before turning to the methodology and case study
evidence on developers’ and workspace providers’
perspectives, the remainder of this section considers the
broader context and explanations for the transition from
‘managed workspaces’ to ‘affordable workspaces’. In
addition to a shift in approach to economic develop-
ment, it argues that the transition has also been
facilitated by (a) a change in political ideology towards
land and property development, and (b) changing
economic structures and land use trends, with a growing
emphasis on ‘mixed use’. Having established what lies
behind this shift, the mechanism of planning gain and
the S106 planning system is explained in more detail,
describing how it has evolved to enable affordable
workspace to be delivered through it.
1.2. From managed workspace to affordable
workspace
The provision and funding of ‘managed workspaces’
by the public sector gathered support in the UK during
the 1980s (Green & Strange, 1999), as it was seen as a
way to support local economic development (Segal
Quince Wicksteed, 1985) and was in line with the
Conservative Government’s ideological commitment to
an ‘enterprise culture’ (Chalkley & Strachan, 1996).
More specifically, it sought to address a number of
identified problems, namely that (1) a restricted
availability of small business premises was acting as
a constraint to their development (Coopers & Lybrand
Associates, 1980; Fothergill, Monk, & Perry, 1987), (2)
small businesses did not generally have the resources to
build their own premises or the stability to commit to
long leases (Chalkley & Perry, 1984), and (3) private
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to the insecurity of returns from small businesses and
the high management costs involved (Ambler &
Kennett, 1985).
The term ‘managed workspace’ is generally used to
describe collections of small workspace units, with
shared services (such as meeting rooms and office
facilities) managed by a third party and let to small
businesses on ‘easy-in, easy-out’ terms. With the
acknowledgement of the creative industries as a
legitimate economic sector in the late 1990s, the
managed workspace format evolved to combine
elements of the older artists’ studios model with the
serviced office space model, providing specific services
for creative industries (Montgomery, 2007).
In the 1990s, approximately two-thirds of managed
workspaces were operated by the public sector
(Chalkley & Strachan, 1996: 162). In recent years,
the private sector has taken a more positive view of the
small business market and now operates a much larger
proportion of all managed workspaces. Workspace
Group, the largest private-sector provider of managed
workspaces in the UK, has grown substantially in the
past 20 years from 400 tenants in the late 1980s (The
Wall Street Transcript, 2005) to over 4000 in the late
2000s (Workspace Group, 2009). At the same time, the
public sector’s appetite for direct provision has waned
and examples are emerging internationally of new
approaches being adopted by the public sector to
delivering workspace for small enterprises and artists in
partnership with the private sector and other institu-
tions. For example, in Amsterdam, the City authority
established a fund for ‘Breeding Places’ (Broedplaat-
sen) providing direct subsidies to property developers
for the development of workspaces for artists and
creative entrepreneurs (Buchholz, 2011; Pot, 2011). In
New York, the City’s Economic Development Corpora-
tion (NYCEDC) established a network of low-cost
workspaces through partnerships with academic insti-
tutions, commercial landlords, space operators and arts
organisations (NYCEDC, 2011). There has therefore
been a shift in approach to the provision of subsidised
workspace for small enterprises; from direct provision
and funding by the public sector to a partnership
approach with the private sector and other institutions,
and – in the UK – the use of the planning system (in
particular planning obligations) to deliver.
Evaluative research on managed workspaces was
most prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s. It was found that
(a) tenants were staying in managed workspaces well
beyond the start-up phase, on the basis of cost and
availability, rather than the additional facilities andservices provided (Green & Strange, 1999) and (b)
businesses in managed workspaces did not have a better
survival rate than the small business sector as a whole
(Chalkley & Strachan, 1996). This research undermined
the value of public subsidy for managed workspaces on
the basis that it was not providing added value and
supporting economic development. Yet, it did not
examine the impact of subsidised workspace on local
economic development, such as the formation of new
business clusters, or the contribution to economic
diversity. Rather, it focused on the benefits to individual
businesses and what this could mean for economic
development. This research explains the shift that has
taken place since the 1990s, from managed workspaces
to affordable workspaces. The subsidy for affordable
workspace is no longer coming directly from the public
purse, but this research suggests that the same problems
persist with affordable workspace provision, namely
that it is benefiting more established businesses rather
than start-ups, and therefore not supporting economic
development. The reasons for this are due to the
organisational priorities of developers and workspace
providers, which will be explained in Sections 3 and 4.
1.3. Drivers of change
1.3.1. Towards a hybrid neoliberal ideology?
A change in political ideology has underpinned and
facilitated the shift from direct funding and provision of
services and infrastructure by the public sector to a
partnership approach with the private sector. The
contemporary system represents a hybrid of political
ideological approaches to land and property develop-
ment that has evolved since the end of the Second World
War. It follows two reasonably distinct ideological
phases of (1) post-war social democratic consensus and
(2) the neoliberalism of the late 1970s and 1980s. In the
post-war era, an enlarged public sector co-existed with
free market capitalism, or state-managed capitalism
(Taylor, 1998; 21). Widespread public ownership of
land meant that the public sector had the power to
control much development. Local authorities owned or
purchased land and built housing on it, retaining
responsibility for on-going maintenance and manage-
ment (Healey, Purdue, & Ennis, 1995). Affordable
housing was provided through public ownership with
the assistance of central government subsidies. In
addition, public services, physical and social infra-
structure were delivered directly by the local authority
(Crook et al., 2006). By the 1970s, a political ideology
of neoliberalism gained widespread prominence due to
the global recession, a decline in profitability of Fordist
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welfare policies, and it was marketed aggressively by
the Thatcher government (Brenner & Theodore, 2002;
Jessop, 2002). This period has been characterised as
‘roll-back’ neoliberalism (see Peck & Tickell, 2002) in
that it was concerned with the destruction of Keynesian-
welfarist and social collective institutions. It was seen as
the role of the market and private property development
to allocate resources. In addition, local government
finance was cut and their powers of policy formulation
and service delivery reduced (Imrie and Thomas,
1999:8). With the sale of publicly owned land, the local
authority lost control over implementation.
By the 1990s, the limitations of ‘roll-back’
neoliberalism became evident and its economic and
social consequences were difficult to contest (Peck &
Tickell, 2002). The ‘Third Way’ approach, promoted by
both the Blair and Clinton administrations, was more
socially interventionist and this trend continues: the
Obama administration in the US is continuing to pursue
a more interventionist federal urban policy regime
(Jonas & McCarthy, 2009). Peck and Tickell (2002)
argue that the neoliberal project did not implode at this
point, rather it transformed into what they describe as
‘roll-out’ neoliberalism, concerned with new forms of
institution building and governmental intervention
within the broad neoliberal project. Raco (2005) argues
that neoliberalism is not always the dominant political
agenda and that increasingly it sits side by side with
other dominant discourses, such as sustainable devel-
opment, to represent ‘‘a hybridity of approaches and
rationalities’’ (Raco, 2005: 324). The increasing use of
planning agreements in the 1990s to secure physical and
social infrastructure through private sector development
represents, it could be argued, this hybrid approach to
planning. Private property concerns are dominant but
the state exerts its influence through the planning
system and seeks to achieve social and economic
objectives through it. Through the evaluation of
affordable workspace policies in the 2000s, this paper
provides an opportunity to explore the effectiveness of
this hybrid approach.
1.3.2. Changing economies and urban structure
The delivery of affordable workspace through
planning policy has also been facilitated by the
significant change in urban land use structure from
predominantly separated land uses to mixed land uses,
which has accompanied the dramatic transformation
from an industrial to a post-industrial economy in
successful cities of developed economies. The shift has
been particularly pronounced in London, which saw asteep decline of traditional manufacturing between the
1960s and 1990s (Sassen, 2001; Thornley, 1992),
alongside an equally dramatic rise in the financial and
business services sector (Clark, 2002; Pratt, 1994, 1997;
Sassen, 2001), and a significant growth in creative
industries (Higgs, Cunningham, & Bakhshi, 2008).
These new growth industries are more compatible with
housing and therefore the need to separate industry and
housing became less acute. Whereas in the post-war era,
upwardly mobile social classes tended to leave the city,
the decline of manufacturing decoupled the association
between inner cities, dirt and pollution (Storper &
Manville, 2006), and the inner city has become popular
as a high-value residential location amongst the middle
class (Butler, Hamnett, & Ramsden, 2008).
These market-led trends towards a repopulation of
the inner city and mixed use were reinforced by a pro-
urban ideology promoted by New Labour in the late
1990s (Cheshire, 1995) expressed in the Urban Task
Force’s report, Towards an Urban Renaissance (DETR,
1999) and the Urban White Paper, Our towns and cities
– the future: Delivering an urban renaissance (DETR,
2000b). These documents called for a repopulation and
revitalisation of inner cities through high density,
mixed-use development on brownfield sites, made
available through the relocation of industry. Trends
towards mixed-use development meant that the price of
employment land was more difficult to regulate through
land use designations, but it created an opportunity for
planners to negotiate affordable workspace from
developers as a concession for planning permission
for mixed use development on employment land. The
way the planning system has evolved to enables this is
explored in the next section.
Most literature assumes that the re-colonisation of
the inner city by higher income residents and the new
economy was an active response to the decline of
manufacturing (Rast, 2001), and the benefits of
regenerating derelict buildings and run-down neigh-
bourhoods are emphasised. This narrative ignores the
impact on the uses that were there before, however
informal. More recently, there is interest in the
displacement of industrial uses through both residential
gentrification (see Curran, 2004, 2007, 2010) and
industrial gentrification (Barnes & Hutton, 2009;
Catungal, Leslie, & Hii, 2009; Hutton, 2009). The
process of industrial gentrification describes the
displacement of lower-value manufacturing businesses,
artists, and creative workers by higher-value knowledge
and creative businesses. It suggests that changes in
urban structure are influenced not only by industrial
decline but also by (a) the inability of manufacturing
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pay higher land costs for central locations (Buck,
Gordon, & Young, 1986), (b) political motivations and
alliances between politicians and different sectors of the
urban community (Rast, 2001), (c) the real estate and
financial sectors and the mass media (Indergaard, 2009;
Zukin, 1988), and (d) the absence of public and political
support for industrial uses in the city (Curran, 2004).
Policies on affordable workspace appear on the
surface to be concerned with preventing the displace-
ment of more vulnerable, low-value businesses, which
occurs with rising property values. However, it is argued
in this paper that, in practice, affordable workspace
policies are having the opposite effect. Developers’ and
workspace providers’ priorities and working practices
mean that both have an interest in attracting higher
value creative industries to occupy the affordable
workspace, and this can accelerate the process of
industrial gentrification.
1.4. Planning obligations and infrastructure
delivery
The use of the Section 106 (S106) planning gain
system to deliver affordable workspace in the UK has
been facilitated by an expansion of the role of planning
and what is deemed acceptable for the planning system
to deliver. This has been achieved through the changes
that have taken place in order to allow the system to
deliver and fund social housing – which in turn has
facilitated a similar approach to be adopted for
affordable workspace.
S106 is an ad hoc local tax, negotiated between the
Council and the developer, with the aim of mitigating
the impacts of the development, and meeting the need
for increased services and infrastructure (London
Assembly, 2008). The concept dates back to the 1947
Planning Act, which nationalised the right to develop
land. The requirement for developers to seek planning
permission for a change of use created the possibility for
land values to increase significantly on the granting of
permission. This in turn allowed for this rise in value to
be captured through a development tax, referred to as
‘betterment’, which enabled the local community to be
compensated for the disruption, loss of amenity or
burden on services caused by new development. The
basic system of planning and betterment remained
relatively unchanged until the early 1990s. Until then,
issues of access, tenure and price were not considered
planning issues, and betterment could only be secured
for issues directly connected to the development itself.
In the 1980s, some local authorities started to use theirown initiative to extract elements of planning gain for
the provision of additional infrastructure and other
contributions of value to the community (Crook &
Whitehead, 2002). In addition, concerns about the
affordability of housing in the 1980s led to new
approaches to regulate the price of housing through the
planning system. One such approach was to secure
affordable housing through cross-subsidy on sites that
were not allocated for housing in the local plan but
granted planning permission for residential develop-
ment on an exceptional basis (see Crook, 1996).
The ability of local authorities to secure infrastruc-
ture not directly connected to the development and
address issues of price and tenure through the planning
system was given statutory weight under Section 106
(S106) of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act.
This was followed by the publication of PPG3 (DoE,
1992) and Circular 6/98 (DETR, 1998), which made the
need for affordable housing a material planning
consideration. The move towards a consistent approach
to affordable housing requirements across local
authorities had the effect of lowering land values on
eligible sites, thereby reducing the cost to social
housing providers of acquiring land, acting as a subsidy
and replacing direct grants. This represented a shift of
the burden of providing affordable homes from
taxpayers and tenants towards landowners, developers
and purchasers of market housing, which demonstrated
a growing ‘fuzziness’ of the boundaries between what
should be funded by the private sector and what should
be funded by the public sector (Crook & Whitehead,
2002). This, in turn, also allowed affordable workspace
to be secured through a similar mechanism. However,
affordable workspace has not been formally established
as a material consideration and in the absence of
national policy guidance and legislation, it remains an
ad hoc policy inconsistently applied across local
authorities, therefore limiting the impact on land values.
The model of delivering infrastructure through the
S106 system was developed within a climate of rising
property prices and high levels of demand. Economic
conditions are now very different and challenge more
fundamentally the pillars of such an approach (see
Parkinson, Blake, & Key, 2009). In August 2012, the
Homes and Communities Agency set up a dedicated
Section 106 Renegotiation Programme, providing
support to local authorities looking to renegotiate the
terms of S106 agreements on major schemes in order to
achieve housing targets. Even before the recession, the
S106 system was criticised as being inconsistent, unfair,
lacking in transparency and a source of substantial
delays (see Hall & Tewdwr-Jones, 2011; Healey et al.,
J. Ferm / Progress in Planning 93 (2014) 1–498
1 The review referred to the most recent published policy document
– either the adopted Unitary Development Plan (UDP) or Core
Strategy (many were still in early stages).1995; Ratcliffe, Stubbs, & Keeping, 2009). Other
systems of financing infrastructure are therefore being
introduced. In 2010, a system of development impact
fees – the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) – was
introduced and all local authorities are required to have
CIL in place by April 2015. CIL is calculated according
to a tariff on development, and used to fund regional and
sub-regional infrastructure. It operates alongside S106,
which is more local in scope (and crucially still is the
mechanism to secure affordable housing). Even before
the majority of local authorities have started to operate
CIL, the Government is consulting on changes, which
would allow developers to negotiate or opt out of the
CIL tariff in some cases and undermine the simplicity of
the system (Geoghegan, 2013). The UK is also piloting
Tax Increment Financing (TIF), which has operated for
over 40 years in the United States. TIF enables local
authorities to borrow against predicted future revenues
(such as business rates) to fund the infrastructure
necessary to facilitate development. Lending is on the
basis that the increased business rate revenues generated
by the scheme can be used to repay the initial
investment. TIF has its limitations (see Jonas &
McCarthy, 2009), the most significant for this discus-
sion is that ‘‘cities can find themselves in fiscal
difficulties if the redevelopment does not produce the
projected increment to pay off the bonds’’ (p.307). In
other words, it is another tax that is dependent on a
healthy development climate to deliver the required
revenues and social benefits.
Despite alternative infrastructure financing methods
being considered, this research is critical for a number
of reasons. First, it appears that the S106 system will
still operate at the local level for the foreseeable future
and the future of CIL is still very uncertain. Second, the
alternatives coming forward still rely on private sector
development and there is little sign that radical
alternatives to the neo-liberal view to urban develop-
ment are being seriously considered (Raco & Street,
2011). Finally, many of the findings are applicable to
any situation where workspace is being delivered in
partnership with developers and workspace providers,
regardless of the specific funding mechanism.
2. Methodology and case study overview
2.1. Overall approach
In order to assess the outcome of affordable
workspace policies, a qualitative research approach
was chosen for this study. A quantitative analysis was
not feasible due to lack of quantitative data, sincerelatively few schemes have actually been implemen-
ted, and even fewer are occupied and embedded in the
local environment. Thus a qualitative approach,
focusing on the perspectives of actors involved in the
delivery of affordable workspace was adopted. This
allowed for the consideration of case studies that had
not yet been completed. It was also considered an
appropriate method of inquiry in order to inform
policymaking:
What qualitative research can offer the policy maker
is a theory of social action grounded on the
experiences – the world view – of those likely to
be affected by a policy decision or thought to be part
of the problem. (Walker, 1985: 19 in Ritchie &
Spencer, 1994)
More specifically, a combined case study and
phenomenological approach was adopted. A multiple-
case design (Yin, 2009) was used to draw comparisons
between different mixed-use schemes. For each case
study, a phenomenological method of inquiry uncov-
ered the subjective experiences of the actors (see Dukes,
1984). These subjective experiences have been com-
bined with other information available for each case
study, drawn from documents or observations.
2.2. Choice of case studies
A review of local authorities’ strategic planning
documents1 undertaken in April 2009 revealed that 17
of the 33 London planning authorities referred to
affordable workspace (or similar terminology) in their
(adopted or emerging) plans. This confirmed the extent
to which affordable workspace was considered to be a
planning issue in London, but also suggested that policy
was still in its early stages. There were strong
similarities between local authorities that had formu-
lated specific policies. The research focused primarily
on the London Borough of Hackney, where ten mixed-
use schemes with affordable workspace had been
implemented since 2003. No other London borough had
implemented a comparable number of schemes. The
focus on Hackney allowed for a more in-depth
investigation in the wider research project into the
borough’s motivations for affordable workspace policy
and its implementation over time. In order to provide
some comparison with other boroughs and schemes
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Map 1. Selected local authorities in the London context. Adapted from Greater London Authority (2011:47, Map 2.2). Ordnance Survey.across London, three further mixed-use schemes with
affordable workspace were identified in the London
boroughs of Camden, Newham and Wandsworth (see
Map 1), which allowed for comparison across different
variables.2 An overview of the thirteen case studies is
provided in Table 1.
2.3. Developers’ and workspace providers’
perspectives
Developers’ and workspace providers’ perspectives
have been chosen as the focus for this paper. The wider
PhD research project also examined the motivations of
local authorities, but this paper has focused on these two
delivery partners for two reasons. First, due to the shift
in responsibilities for the delivery of infrastructure and
services away from the public sector and the paucity of
knowledge available on the perspectives of delivery
partners in the contemporary context. Second, a
selective focus on the two partners allows for a more
in depth analysis and coverage of the rich data available.
In order to gain an understanding of the developers’
perspective, a mixed approach was used, drawing on
both written material and interviews. Where interviews
were obtained, perspectives were assessed according to
whether they viewed affordable workspace primarily as
an ‘opportunity’, a ‘tool to secure planning permission’,2 (1) Central or inner London location (2) Extent of influence of the
local authority (3) Residential or commercial developer (4) Partnered
with charitable or commercial workspace provider (5) Type of target
tenant.or a ‘burden’. Questions also focused on how the
proposal came about, their experience of delivering it,
of appointing a workspace provider, and the outcome of
the scheme. In addition, further analysis was undertaken
of the final scheme design, marketing material and
planning statements. Where affordable workspace was
considered to be integral to the scheme and used in the
developers’ marketing material, this suggested they
perceived it as an opportunity. Developers who
mentioned it in their planning statements, but did not
integrate it into their schemes or mention it in their
marketing material were considered to view AW
primarily as a tool to obtain planning permission.
Those who saw it as a burden generally did not mention
it in official documents, although there perspectives
were confirmed through interview.
Gaining a rounded understanding of the workspace
providers’ perspective was more complex since not all
the case study developments had appointed a workspace
provider. There were four workspace providers that had
partnered with developers in the selected case studies. It
was therefore decided to initially focus the analysis on
these four, who represented different categories of type
of workspace provider: (i) commercial, (ii) not-for-
profit, targeting small businesses and (iii) not-for-profit
targeting artists. In addition to the interviews with
Directors (or equivalent) of the organisations, the
organisation’s website, official reports and publications,
press articles and informal documents provided by the
interviewees were consulted. The research also con-
sidered four workspace providers that were not partners
in mixed-use schemes with affordable workspace,
allowing a broader spectrum of providers to be
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Table 1





Term Cost to WP Cost to tenant
London Borough of Hackney
Canalside Works,
8-14 Orsman Road














7 years £4 psf Unknown
Burberry, 29-53
Chatham Place






Phase 2 with AW
suspended.
10 years 50% market
value
Unknown
Adelaide Wharf Firstbase Shoreditch Trust Completed 2007.
Fully occupied 2011.
10 years £1 psf N/S in S106. £240
per desk space a
month.




















£9.45 psf N/S in S106.
Paradise Park, 142
Leabridge Road
Phoenix Logistics Not appointed. Completed 2009.
Commercial units
occupied early 2011.













10 years Not stated 50% market value






















Not appointed. Under construction
2011. Completion
due Spring 2011.



















Acme Studios Under construction
2011. Due to
complete Oct 2012.








Workspace Group Consent 2007.
Development due to
commence 2011.







a Not included in analysis of developers’ perspectives (Section 2) due to insufficient information (interview or written documentation).
J. Ferm / Progress in Planning 93 (2014) 1–49 11considered and more robust conclusions to be drawn.
Areas of questioning focused on the background and
business model of the workspace provider, their target
tenants, their operational requirements, the perceived
advantages and disadvantages of providing affordable
workspace within mixed-use developments, their
experience of the planning and implementation of the
case study development (if applicable), and their
perception of affordable workspace policies.
This research has been limited in the extent to which
it can describe the experiences of local businesses – the
users of the space. This is because, at the start of the
fieldwork in 2008, only one of the thirteen schemes
(Canalside Works) had any tenants, and here only two of
the twelve units were occupied. Of the remaining case
studies, some were completed but not yet occupied,
others were not yet complete or construction had not
started, and one was still being determined at Planning
Inquiry. At that stage, it was therefore considered
unviable to include the users in the research design.
Although progress was made on these developments
during the course of the research and writing-up phase,
it was not considered feasible from a time or resource
perspective to extend the study. This could, however, be
an area for interesting future research.
2.4. Case study overview and broad analysis
Table 1 provides an overview of the 13 mixed-use
schemes. The data was gathered through site observa-
tion, interviews and document analysis, in particular the
S106 agreements for the schemes.
Information on scheme progress and the appointment
of a workspace provider provides a measure of success.
Of the 13 schemes in total, six were still under
construction or due to start. Of these, only three had
appointed a workspace provider. However, the impact of
the recession in the middle of the fieldwork meant that
lack of progress on schemes could not be attributed to
problems with implementing policy. The seven schemes
that had been completed were more informative.
Workspace providers had only been appointed in three
of these schemes, and these were either fully or nearly
fully occupied. The remaining four schemes did not have
workspace providers. Of these, two were fully occupied,
one was partially occupied and another was still
unoccupied and being marketed by commercial agents.
The fact that two were occupied represents a failure of
policy to operate as intended, i.e. through the appoint-
ment of a workspace provider. Given that all these
schemes are relatively new, strong conclusions cannot be
drawn about the ‘success’ of these schemes from thesefigures. However, Sections 3 and 4 investigate this issue
further, looking at the reasons why developers are finding
it difficult to secure workspace provider partners, or why
schemes are not tenanted.
Table 1 allows for observations to be made regarding
the assessment of ‘affordability’ of workspace in the
case studies. The problem is that it was mostly not
possible to obtain a figure for the cost to be paid by the
end tenant. In over half of the cases, the S106
agreements specified only the cost to the workspace
provider. In two of the Hackney case studies (Oak
Wharf and Leabridge Road), the S106 agreement did
state the rate at which the workspace provider ‘‘must
sub-let the whole or any part of the Affordable B1
Workspace Units for use as affordable workspace’’.
Given the agreement is signed with the developer and
not the workspace provider, it is difficult to see how this
clause could be enforced. Nevertheless, in both these
cases, it was not possible to obtain interviews with the
developers and workspace providers had not been
appointed. It was therefore not easy to verify. Although
the fact that both these schemes were occupied by
individual tenants or marketed through commercial
agents suggests that the space was let at market rent.
Where the cost to the end tenant is provided, this was
based on approximate figures provided verbally by
the workspace providers. Rents ranged from £9 psf
to £34 psf, depending on the scheme, the location
and type of workspace provider. Reasons for the
large variation are discussed in Section 4 which
investigates workspace providers’ operational models
and perspectives.
The lease term is another consideration that has an
impact on the ability to secure affordability in the long-
term. This is the length of the term (in years) that the
developer is required to let the space to the workspace
provider at the agreed rent in the S106 agreement. In
four of the case studies, the affordable lease terms are
secured ‘in perpetuity’ (or 125 years) since the
workspace provider has purchased the workspace
outright or on a long lease. In the case of Eagle House,
the lease term was being negotiated between the
developer and the local authority. However, in the
remaining majority of the cases, the lease term secured
was only short; between 5 and 15 years.
In addition to the questions and hypotheses posed at
the beginning of this research, Sections 3 and 4 explore
some of the reasons why developers are finding it difficult
to appoint workspace providers and to deliver affordable
workspace as prescribed in their S106 agreements, and
why the appointment of workspace providers will not
guarantee ‘affordability’ of workspace.
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This chapter explores developers’ behaviour and
perspectives on delivering planning policy objectives
through the lens of affordable workspace policy. More
specifically it explores (a) their perceptions of afford-
able workspace policy, (b) their experiences of
partnering with workspace providers to deliver afford-
able workspace, (c) the factors that influenced their
perspectives, and (d) how their perspectives then
influenced the outcomes. Developers’ perspectives
are considered on a case study basis, divided into three
categories depending on the way in which the affordable
workspace proposal emerged:
 The developer as originator
 The local authority as originator; or
 Inherited planning permission
The analysis shows that developers who instigated
the affordable workspace proposals themselves are
more likely to perceive affordable workspace as an
‘opportunity’, and see the wider benefits, acknowledg-
ing the contribution of affordable workspace to the
success of the development as a whole. Conversely,
those who inherited a site with planning permission,
where affordable workspace provision was a condition,
were most likely to see affordable workspace as a
‘burden’ and were least likely to deliver. Where the
affordable workspace proposal originated with the local
authority and emerged as a proposal through discus-
sions at pre-application stage, developers were most
likely to see affordable workspace as a ‘tool’ to obtain
planning permission. Payne (2009) distinguishes
between developers who are ‘pioneers’, ‘pragmatists’
and ‘sceptics’. The former are more likely to be
regeneration specialists, typically small, local and
independent developers (Guy, Henneberry, & Rowley,
2002), although it includes one of the UK’s leading
housebuilders, Berkeley Homes (Karadimitriou, 2005).
This chapter suggests that this categorisation is helpful
in understanding developers’ perspectives and strate-
gies on delivering affordable workspace, and considers
the factors that might influence their approach.
In addition to considering the process as a factor
influencing developers’ perspectives, the case studies
consider also the type of developer delivering the
proposal, and how this might influence their perspec-
tives and the outcomes. There has been a longstanding
distinction in the UK between residential and com-
mercial developers, which persists despite the trend
towards mixed use (Havard, 2008). The majority of thedevelopers in this research are ‘residential-led’, i.e. they
make most of their money through the construction and
sale of housing, although some have previous experi-
ence of delivering mixed use schemes. This is
necessarily the case, since affordable workspace policy
comes into play on residential or mixed use schemes,
rather than commercial-only schemes. There are two
commercial-led developers included in the research. In
these cases, affordable workspace policy has come into
play because they have sought to modernise their
business workspace through mixed use redevelopment,
with housing as cross-subsidy. Other important distinc-
tions have been made in the literature between
‘developer-dealers’ (or ‘developer traders’) and ‘devel-
oper-investors’ (Adams, 1994; Havard, 2008). The
former move quickly from one scheme to the next and
do not retain a long-term interest in the development.
The latter typically hold and manage completed
developments, retaining equity as a long-term invest-
ment; as such they have a greater interest in place-
making (Adams & Tiesdell, 2013).
3.1. The developer as originator
In two of the case studies, the proposal for affordable
workspace in the mixed use development originated
with the developer. In the case of the former Lesney Toy
Factory, the residential-led developer, Telford Homes,
formed an early partnership with workspace providers,
Acme Studios, and together they made an application to
the Council. At Wandsworth Business Village, the
commercial-led developer, Workspace Group Glebe,
made an application for the redevelopment of an
outdated business village, which required residential
development as cross-subsidy. Both developers were
pro-active in their inclusion of affordable workspace in
their schemes. However, there are differences in their
perceptions of affordable workspace and the outcomes
of the schemes. Each is considered in turn below.
3.1.1. Telford Homes: former Lesney toy factory
Telford Homes are the developers of the former
Lesney Toy Factory in Hackney, which is a large mixed
use scheme including 49 affordable artists studios.
Affordable workspace was a key feature in Telford
Homes’ proposals submitted as part of their planning
application (CMA Planning, 2007), in which Acme
Studios was named as the proposed workspace provider
partner. The partnership with Acme was formed
independently of the Council and early in the
preparation of the scheme’s design. The section of
the planning statement describing the ‘commercial use’
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affordable workspace component, which comprised
approximately two-thirds of the total commercial
floorspace. The applicants focused on the importance
of the creative economy, their partnership with Acme
and the fact that the units would be occupied
immediately.
The centrality of the affordable studios to the scheme
was illustrated again in the use of Acme in Telford
Homes’ exhibition presented to local people as part of
Telford Homes’ consultation for the planning applica-
tion.3 The exhibition featured a ‘‘new artists’ quarter’’,
which was clearly a selling point for the development
and integral to the scheme. This is consistent with the
comments of the Managing Director in interview:
I think it’s a fantastic proposal for that site. You’ve
got affordable commercial. You’ve got artists that
work. They don’t just work 9 to 5, some of them have
jobs and they use their studios in the evening, so
you’ve got some vibrancy, some different sort of life
going through there. . . We know that true regenera-
tion works on sites where you have private housing,
affordable housing, private commercial and afford-
able commercial, but also get arts and culture in
there as well. So, when I met with Acme studios, I
liked what I saw. . . and I kind of got hooked a little
bit really, I suppose. I was interested in what they’ve
done and what it has brought to society. . . and how it
can help communities build.
The concept of affordable artists’ studios contributed
to a regeneration package, which was used by the
developer to prepare a planning case and market the
development. As Acme Studios claimed in a presenta-
tion in April 2008: ‘‘Telford need us to achieve planning
consent on a brownfield site’’ (Acme, 2008b). However,
the benefits were not only tactical; they were financial
also. The Managing Director of Telford Homes
emphasised the fact that Acme has a waiting list of
about 8–900 artists within London, of which about 100
are looking for space in Hackney, so the units would
almost certainly be occupied from the outset.
So that was a real plus for us as well, a real incentive.
Because obviously we’ve sold it, so it’s a massive
financial incentive the fact that we’ve contracted
something and we haven’t got it on our books3 Copy of exhibition panel (pdf format) provided by Director of
Acme Studios (unpublished).anymore. And the fact that it’s occupied from day one
and there’s some life there, some vibrancy.
The greatest financial driver of the scheme overall is
the residential part of the development, consistent with
Telford Homes’ niche as a housing developer. The
Managing Director explained that when they first saw
the site, they saw the potential it offered adjacent to the
River Lee with views over the marshes. He claimed they
were unaware of the designation of the site for
employment use when they purchased it, which meant
residential use had to be the main driver in order for the
scheme to stack up given the high purchase price. Any
commercial use that was proposed in the scheme then
had to be compatible with the residential, so as not to
lower its value. This suggests that the affordable
workspace component became increasingly important
to the developer as a way of both meeting the Council’s
requirements for continued employment use and
maximising the overall value of the development.
That’s why I think the Acme studio thing works. If
you can get that into a community, that’s commercial
space that does work in a residential place. A
warehouse doesn’t, or light industrial doesn’t, like
Lesneys Toys, banging away in the evening and stuff
like that. . .
So Telford Homes saw both regeneration and
financial benefits to including artists’ studios in their
proposal. However, it also appears to be the only form of
commercial space that they believed would be viable in
this location. The Managing Director was genuinely
sceptical about the viability of site if they were to re-
provide the 9000 m2 of employment floorspace that the
Council required, especially given the million square
feet (92,900 m2) of state-of-the-art commercial space
coming forward as part of the legacy of the Olympics,
within walking distance of the Lesney site.
In the Lesney case, the residential-led developer,
Telford Homes, was the driver behind the proposal for
affordable workspace and considered it to provide a
number of opportunities. The affordable workspace was
key to the developer selling a complete regeneration
package to both the planners and the public. In selling
the concept to the planners, the focus was on the
provision of affordable workspace and meeting a
particular need in the borough, in order to try and
secure planning permission for a change of use. For
local people and prospective buyers, the emphasis was
on an artists’ quarter and how this would contribute to
the overall vibrancy and quality of the scheme. In
addition, although the affordable workspace was to be
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developer still considered there to be financial benefits
to providing affordable workspace. Its perception of
affordable workspace fundamentally as an opportunity
was heavily influenced by the early partnership it
formed with Acme Studios, and the fact that this took
place in advance of the scheme’s design and submission
of its planning application, enabling Telford Homes to
factor in the workspace into the scheme, both
conceptually and financially.
3.1.2. Workspace Group Glebe: Wandsworth
business village
The developer for Wandsworth Business Village is
Workspace Group Glebe – a partnership between
Workspace Group (the workspace providers) and
property and investment company, Glebe. Workspace
Group has a long history as the providers of workspace
on the Wandsworth site and describes itself as ‘‘the
leading provider of affordable commercial property to
let on flexible terms to small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs) in and around London’’ (Workspace
Group, 2011). In its capacity as a developer partner, the
company therefore brings with it extensive commercial
expertise, with a particular focus on small businesses. It
retains a long-term management and investment interest
in the development.
In the developers’ planning statement, the core
proposal was to replace an out-dated business village
with the provision of ‘‘flexible, affordable business
units, specifically tailored to the small and medium
enterprises’’ (Rolfe Judd, 2007: 3), delivered by mixed-
use enabling development, including 209 residential
units. This development is therefore different to the
other case studies, where the affordable workspace
represents a small proportion of the total floorspace.
Here, it is not only integral to the scheme, it is what
drives it. The proposal originated with the developer as
Wandsworth Council did not have a policy on
affordable workspace at the time. The proposal was
welcomed by the Mayor of London (Greater London
Authority, 2007).
Workspace Group interpret affordable workspace as
flexible workspace:
What small businesses look for is a small place that
has its own front door but that is very flexible. . . So
our business model is providing flexible inexpensive
workspace in London for small businesses.
Given that Workspace Group’s core business is to
deliver workspace in buildings where a relatively large
number of units can be accommodated, subsidising theworkspace is not an option. In fact, they are finding that
it is generally not viable to build new workspace
without enabling development:
On some of our sites, where they’re coming to the end
of their natural life. . . what you really need to do is
knock it down and start again. But it’s not viable
because the build costs are higher than the value. . .
there’s got to be some enabling development by way
of residential.
Although Workspace Group’s business model is to
provide flexible workspace, they are not happy for the
S106 agreement to be too prescriptive, as banks are
reluctant to lend money for developments where there
are constraints on the future sale of the property:
So we had a S106 agreement which talked about the
types of leases and the numbers of tenants and the
maximum size of units that we could have. Now the
problem with doing that is that. . .we don’t really have
any competitors who are the same size as us. . . So
therefore whilst we might say that it’s our business to
rent to small businesses and therefore we’re quite
happy with this, we’re quite happy with three-year
leases with three-month break clauses. But the problem
that you have is that you can’t then sell that building.
Workspace Group used the concept of affordable
workspace as a selling point for the redevelopment of an
out-dated business village and a way to secure mixed
use on an employment site to allow for enabling
development. However, they were not prepared to
subsidise any affordable workspace as this would
undermine their business model as commercial provi-
ders of flexible workspace for small businesses.
Although the Wandsworth scheme was not yet under
construction at the time of writing, Workspace Group’s
track record and comparison with similar schemes they
have delivered suggests that the workspace is likely to
be successfully delivered and occupied, albeit at
commercial, market rates.
3.2. The local authority as originator
In the majority of case studies, the proposal for
affordable workspace originated with the local authority
through discussions with the developer at pre-applica-
tion stage. It was usually clear to the developer that the
application would not be approved unless the require-
ment to provide affordable workspace was met. All
developers in this group therefore perceive affordable
workspace as a ‘tool’ to secure planning permission.
However, they differ in the extent to which they see
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deliver affordable workspace in the spirit of the policy.
Some developers also substantially changed their
perception of affordable workspace during the course
of negotiation and implementation.
3.2.1. Unite Group: Arundel House, Hatton Garden
(London Borough of Camden)
Unite Group is ‘‘the UK’s leading developer and
manager of student accommodation’’ (Unite Group,
2008) and the developer of a mixed use scheme at
Arundel House, with affordable workspace studios on the
lower-ground and ground floors and student accommo-
dation on the upper floors. Their focus on student
accommodation informs their perspective on mixed use:
The core product for Unite is student accommoda-
tion; that’s how we make our money. Any mixed-use
element, any commercial or other use, is a by-
product of us getting student accommodation. We
don’t go out to do that; it’s the nature of how the
planning system acts upon us.
Unite’s focus on student accommodation means that
they do not see the commercial potential of providing
workspace; they consider it to have little or nil value.
When they initially started discussions with Camden
regarding their proposal for student accommodation on
a former employment site, Camden requested that they
provide workshops for the jewellery industry, in line
with their policy for Hatton Garden. Unite’s response to
Camden’s requirement that they provide the workshops
at £5 psf was that they would be happy to ‘‘write off’’
the space on the lower-ground floor:
For us it was fantastic, because no-one would have
wanted to live there, we couldn’t use it for student
accommodation.
After further consideration, Camden requested the
ground floor in addition to the lower-ground, which
Unite were happy to provide if Camden could grant
them a concession of an additional floor. However,
Unite thought there would be little demand for the units
and envisaged converting the workshops to student
accommodation at some point in the future:
The other aspect for us was that we were pretty
certain that there wouldn’t be a market for these
workshop units. Because you see the way they’re set
out is almost identical to the studios above. So we
thought that after a certain period, we could convert
these back – when Camden realise that this crazy
idea will never work!However, the Council had a dedicated team working
in Hatton Garden who knew the local market very well.
They also managed the tender process for the
appointment of a workspace provider, who managed
to fill all the workshop units.
The Design and Planning Director explained that the
Council had sold the concept of affordable workspace to
them on the basis that the workshops would be targeted
at start-up businesses and Unite became positive about
the proposal, believing the units would be occupied by
young people providing synergies between the two
elements of the scheme.
The other aspect for us was the synergies and the fact
that in principle it was a good idea – workshops for
up and coming businesses. Having visited Lang-
dales, you see a lot of small businesses, young
people, they could have been students in our building
– so that’s another lovely story to tell, there’s a lot of
positive aspects there. So that was also a good sell
for us, in terms of the marketing we do.
However, closer to completion, it became clear that
the majority of the units would be occupied by
established businesses who were relocating from
elsewhere in Hatton Garden and the developers felt
they had been misled.
I was slightly dismayed by that because you’ve got
established businesses moving out and in effect we’re
subsidising them through this building. And the
original intention for this was for people starting up.
It left a bitter taste in my mouth. Why are we
subsidising uncompetitive organisations? If they’re
failing because they weren’t efficient enough, they
need to close down and the younger ones will come
up in their place.
Unite conceded that their agreement to work with
Camden to provide the workshops was motivated by
their desire to develop a good working relationship with
a borough where they intend to develop more schemes
in the future:
The perception of Unite by Camden is also
important. As a developer, we’re only going to
develop in certain locations where the students want
to be and where the universities are located. So we
want to show willing, we want to work with these
boroughs. I’d like to think that Unite has a good
name in Camden.
Unite’s scheme has been successful in that it is now
fully occupied, mostly by businesses in the jewellery
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the provision of workshops, they soon understood it was
a pre-requisite for their obtaining planning permission
and acknowledged that it is a positive use for those parts
of the building that are not suitable for living
accommodation. Furthermore, they saw the marketing
opportunities that the provision of workshops for the
jewellery industry offered. The Council’s assistance in
providing evidence of demand from the jewellery
industry and in appointing a workspace provider
contributed to the positive view of affordable workspace
they ultimately held:
For us it would be something that we could look at in
other developments and try to kick-start. . . I suppose
it could be a benefit for us – maybe we could manage
it ourselves, with our management capabilities.
3.2.2. Firstbase: Adelaide Wharf
Adelaide Wharf is the first mixed-use scheme with
affordable workspace to be delivered by Firstbase, who
describe themselves as ‘‘residential-led urban regenera-
tion developers’’ (Firstbase, 2006: 28) and have become
known for their innovative new model for affordable
home ownership (Firstbase, 2009). The decision to
include affordable workspace at Adelaide Wharf arose
from discussions with Hackney Council prior to planning
application. The scheme put forward by Firstbase
proposed significantly less employment floorspace than
a previously consented scheme. However, through
discussions with the local authority it was agreed that
it would be acceptable if the employment floorspace were
delivered as affordable workspace, and the developer saw
the opportunities this presented in securing planning
permission. In addition, there were also financial and
wider regenerative benefits perceived by the developer.
In terms of financial benefits, the Project Manager
saw affordable workspace as beneficial in that it
provided a positive use for parts of the development that
were not easy to sell for residential, plus it helped to
offset other Section 106 payments:
I think it’s always a bit of give and take in Section106
negotiations. So whereas you might be obliged to
provide more affordable workspace here, you may
then be given a little bit more comfort in other
[areas] like traffic contributions or other community
contributions. Also in central London especially,
there are parts of an estate or a building whereby you
might not see great incomes. . . So for example at
Adelaide Wharf, on the ground floor where the
entrance to this B1 space is, you may have hadtrouble marketing that space given that it fronts quite
a busy road. And so that sort of lends itself to more of
a commercial use. So if you can use that space and I
guess maybe secure some 106 contributions through
using that space for affordable workspace, then
that’s probably not a bad combination.
The affordable workspace was not a selling point
from the developer’s perspective. Adelaide Wharf’s
dedicated website made no mention of the affordable
workspace (Firstbase, 2007). This was confirmed by
Firstbase’s Project Manager:
To be honest, I’d like to say that people wanted to live
there because of the mixed-use nature of it. But I
think the key worker housing was sold just on the
back of its own affordability.
Therefore, although the developer was able to see
clear planning and financial benefits to including
affordable workspace, it is evident that the residential
component of the development was the most important:
the affordable workspace was not considered integral to
the scheme, and there is no substantial evidence that the
affordable workspace was being used to enhance the
saleability of the housing. On the contrary, the project
manager’s explanation of the decisions regarding the
location of the workspace within the development show
a desire to keep the residential and workspace
components as separate as possible:
We found the place where [the workspace has] been
located on the ground floor gives an opportunity for
its own street entrance and its own direct entrance
without having to go through any of the residential
cores or go anywhere near other people’s front
doors. So that drives its location.
In addition, the developer emphasised the impor-
tance of the choice of workspace provider, who controls
the types of businesses that occupy the space. From
Firstbase’s perspective, it was important to ensure that
any future occupiers do not disturb the residents and that
they help to retain the value of the development:
There’s a danger I suppose of going in with a
relatively amateur operator and they’ll turn it into a
workshop or a noisy workplace or sort of . . . fairly
untidy. . .because it’s a shared space with residents,
it should be a clean workspace. Not a sort of metal
shop and bits and pieces left lying around. And I
guess you’d hope that it would not be too dense a
workspace, just because of the wear and tear of the
building and the fact that there are shared facilities.
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affordable workspace are carefully controlled through
the choice of workspace provider. This also shows how
the developer relies on the workspace provider to
deliver and manage the space on their behalf.
In Firstbase’s case, the provision of affordable
workspace was seen initially as a tool to secure planning
permission, but they also found that it provided a
positive use for the less marketable space within the
development, and was a way to offset other perhaps
more costly Section 106 contributions. However, the
workspace and mixed-use nature of the scheme was not
embraced as an opportunity to create a brand or market
the development to a certain clientele – probably due to
its niche as an affordable housing developer. The
residential component was clearly the focus and every
effort was made to ensure occupation of the units by
‘cleaner and quieter’ industries. Its partnership with a
‘reputable’ workspace provider and the location of the
workspace away from the residential core was key to
this.
3.2.3. Aitch Group: Burberry, Chatham Place
Aitch Group are niche developers of the former
Burberry site in Chatham Place, Hackney, with
expertise in both residential and commercial develop-
ment. Hackney Council refused their first planning
application due to loss of employment floorspace, and
recommended that either the total employment floor-
space increase substantially or they should provide a
proportion of the proposed floorspace as ‘affordable
workspace’. The developer’s revised application
reflected the affordable workspace option.
Although it was the Council that instigated the
affordable workspace proposal, there were distinct
advantages for the developer in choosing this option: it
was a straightforward route to obtaining planning
permission for the scheme. Furthermore, Aitch Group
has managed to turn it round to its advantage. As Aitch
Group’s marketing material shows, phase II includes
‘‘commercial space, designed to attract sole traders and
start-up companies [which] will be retained by Aitch
Group as an investment’’ (Aitch Group, 2009). This was
confirmed by their agent, who indicated that Aitch
Group have put themselves forward as the workspace
providers for the scheme. In addition, in his description
of the initial design of the scheme, he described the
workshop units as being quite ‘artisan’ attracting young
designers – ‘‘maybe they’ll design from there and
maybe have a little bit of retail and a little bit of
manufacturing or something like that’’. This suggests
that the affordable workspace units are consideredintegral to the scheme and became a positive addition to
the development concept. However the construction of
phase II was delayed and their agent suggested they
would need to wait and see how Burberry is trading in
order to finally determine the types of tenants that take
up space there. When interviewed a second time in
2011, when phase II was still on hold, he was more
reluctant to discuss the affordable element of the
scheme and appeared to be less confident of its delivery.
It is therefore difficult to assess the likely success of the
scheme.
Although Aitch Group saw the planning benefits of
including affordable workspace as an opportunity, and
put themselves forward as the workspace provider, they
still had reservations about the way the Council
envisaged the implementation of the affordable work-
space since they have a different understanding of the
concept of ‘affordable’. As summarised by Aitch
Group’s agent, ‘‘their view is affordable means cheap
and our view is affordable means it’s flexible. So I don’t
know how that circle is going to be squared.’’ Aitch
Group’s perception of affordable workspace as a tool to
secure planning permission was influenced by the way
the affordable workspace proposals emerged in
discussions with the Council. Following this, the
developer’s commercial expertise has meant that they
have strong views on what affordable workspace means
and this could be an on-going discussion with the
Council.
3.2.4. Phoenix Logistics: Paradise Dock, 142 Lea
Bridge Road
The developers of the proposed scheme at Paradise
Dock were the residential-led Phoenix Logistics.
Evidence for the developers’ perspective on affordable
workspace was initially provided in their planning
statement accompanying the planning application. The
developers argued for a proposed change of use from
industrial to mixed-use residential and commercial
office use. All the proposed commercial floorspace was
to be affordable workspace and this was central to the
developers’ argument for a change of use.
The planning statement (DP9, n.d.) identified
regional policies in the London Plan (GLA, 2004a)
supporting the provision of affordable workspace and
quoted Supplementary Planning Guidance on Industrial
Capacity (GLA, 2004b) which encouraged ‘‘the re-
development of London’s industrial areas to enhance
their position as competitive locations to be more
attractive to modern industry, subject to securing low
cost premises to meet local needs’’ (DP9, n.d.:17–18).
The developers then argued that a 15% re-provision of
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‘‘it is proposed that the employment floorspace will be
offered as affordable workspace, which will be provided
at a reduced rent’’ (p. 18). They further argued that B1
use ‘‘is considered to be the most appropriate use for
this element of the scheme’’ since ‘‘the low level of
disturbance associated with this use class makes it
compatible with the proposed residential element of the
Development and the existing surrounding residential
properties’’ (p.19).
An interview conducted with the developers prior to
implementing the development further revealed that
affordable workspace was a key part of their argument
to secure lower levels of affordable housing, thus
increasing the profit potential of the scheme. It also
showed that they would not even need to subsidise the
affordable workspace component in order for the
scheme to meet the Council’s requirements.
It’s not really a high value area, so we wouldn’t have
been able to get much for commercial in that area
anyway. The Council put a cap in the S106 on what
we could charge; I think it was between £5 and
£10 psf. We wouldn’t have been able to get much
more in that location anyway. And it facilitated
planning. We were also able to negotiate 33%
affordable housing on the scheme, which is less than
the 50% normally required.
Thus the developers saw the provision of affordable
workspace, to comply with policy, as an opportunity to
secure planning permission for a change of use and
negotiate lower levels of affordable housing. They did
not see it as a financial burden, since it would have
minimal impact on rental income. The scheme,
implemented in 2009, was fully occupied by 2011,
but the developers had not partnered with a workspace
provider. The residential component of the scheme
overlooks Paradise Park and the River Lea and is kept
separate – with the use of a locked gate – from the
commercial components that occupy the heritage
buildings on the site. Although the short telephone
interview granted with the developers did not allow for
these issues to be thoroughly explored, observation of
the completed development suggests that the developers
fully exploited the potential of the site, ensuring that the
heritage buildings required to be retained were occupied
and that the residential component could benefit from
the site’s prime characteristics and not be de-valued by
its commercial elements. Certainly the marketing
material for Paradise Dock (Vision Homes, 2008) did
not mention the commercial element of the scheme, let
alone its ‘affordable’ nature.3.2.5. Mosaic Homes: Oak Wharf
It was not possible to obtain an interview with the
developers for Oak Wharf, Mosaic Homes. However,
the Employment and Marketing Report and Planning
Statement prepared to accompany the planning applica-
tion provide an insight into their motivations and views
on the affordable workspace.
The Employment and Marketing Report (Nelson
Bakewell, 2005) described how Oak Wharf was used as
a timber yard for approximately 80 years, employing
some 20 people at its peak in the 1950/60s. The business
ceased trading and the property became vacant in
February 2004. Since then, the property was marketed
as a commercial development site for over a year, with
no sale achieved. Oak Wharf was not a recognised
commercial location and several local agents indicated
that the combination of poor public transport links and
surrounding residential uses made it an ‘‘unrecognised
and unpractical location for new commercial space. . .
However, opportunity may exist for small-scale devel-
opment which would be marketed specifically for small
businesses and cottage industries who during their
formative stages prefer to work from home or close to
home. In this regard location and transportation will
therefore not be an issue’’ (p.9). This indicates the
owners were having trouble marketing it as a
commercial site and were therefore required to look
at a mix of alternative uses. The report estimated that
Oak Wharf would achieve only 75% of the average
market rental for new warehouse units in the borough
and only 50% of the rental for new office units and that
this has been a deterrent for potential commercial
developers. As such, it acknowledged that ‘‘due to its
location a rental discount may have to be provided as an
incentive to lease the space’’ (p.9).
In the introduction to the Planning Statement, the
developers listed ‘‘providing affordable start-up work-
space’’ (FirstPlus Planning, 2005:5) as one of the key
benefits of the redevelopment to regenerate the area.
They argued that redevelopment of the employment
land for mixed use is appropriate since (a) the site was
derelict and vacant, (b) there was a lack of demand for
commercial use on the site due to its location and
access, and (c) the Employment and Marketing Report
showed that ‘‘the only form of employment use that can
be sustained on the site is small scale employment space
offered at below market rent’’ (p.18). Enabling
residential development was, however, required in
order to offset the cost of the employment space (p.19).
In the developers’ description of the proposed
scheme, it stated that the employment use, mostly
flexible start-up workspace, was designed as a
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residential blocks ‘‘to encourage the integration of the
employment and residential parts of the development. . .
The integration of affordable workspace in this way is
intended to provide continual activity and vitality to the
development and the commercial element will be a back
drop to the residential part of the site’’ (p.20). This
suggests the affordable workspace is integrated into the
design and that it is considered to be of significant
benefit to the scheme’s overall success. However,
observational evidence suggests otherwise. The scheme
was completed in summer 2009, but the commercial
units were still unoccupied in January 2011 and being
marketed as a single unit on the open market by
commercial agents, Currell, who confirmed that the
space would not be let as flexible space to smaller
occupiers, and there was no mention of subsidy.4 It
appears that, in this case, the proposals for affordable
workspace in the planning application were purely a
tool to secure planning permission for a change of use.
As an appendix to the Planning Statement, the
developers attached a summary of meetings and
telephone conversations with council officers and other
agencies between February 2004 and November 2005.
This information provides an insight into the negotia-
tions between the local authority and developer on the
provision of affordable workspace and suggests that the
Council was the main driver behind the affordable
workspace proposals. In the first three meetings
(February to July 2004), the developers’ summary of
the discussion suggested that the Council was open to
mixed-use on the site, but that it insisted on the
development being ‘employment-led’, i.e. comprising
at least 50% of the total floor area. It was not until a
meeting in March 2005 that the Council indicated it
would require some affordable units on the site. In April
2005, the Council suggested there may be some
european funding available and that subsidy should
be made available to a provider or individual businesses
through regeneration or other funding agencies. By
August 2005, the Council stated more categorically that
employment was a big issue and it ‘‘can only accept [a]
net loss if affordable employment space [is] provided’’.
It was not until November 2005, a month before the
developer submitted the planning application that the
draft S106 for affordable workspace was mentioned and
the Council agreed to send a copy to the developer’s
agents.4 Personal communication from agent at Currall Commercial, 27
January 2011.Although the indications are that the developers
‘came round’ to the idea of embracing affordable
workspace on the site as the only viable commercial use
there, the observational evidence now that the scheme is
complete suggests that the proposals for affordable
workspace in the planning application were primarily a
tool to secure planning permission for a change of use.
There may have been attempts to secure workspace
providers that have not been made public. Certainly the
timing of the completion of these schemes during the
recession may have meant that the developers were
struggling to meet other commitments in the S106 that
possibly had higher priority, and the Council was in a
weak negotiating position. However, the fact that the
developers did not respond to requests for interview
means that it has not been possible to ascertain the full
story.
3.2.6. Sheinman & Sheinman: Well Street
A family-run enterprise, Sheinman & Sheinman,
were the owners of the Well Street site since before the
Second World War. Until the 1990s, the site was mostly
used for clothes manufacturing. In the early 2000s, the
owners looked at options for redevelopment since the
building was achieving low rental income and was
considered a management liability. Commercial rede-
velopment of the site did not stack up financially, and
the Council would not accept a change of use or loss of
employment floorspace if cross-funded by private
residential housing. As a result, they prepared a
proposal with Islington & Shoreditch Housing Associa-
tion for 100% affordable housing on the site. According
to the Director, the Council insisted on including
affordable workspace on ground and first floors as well,
and would not accept market commercial space in the
scheme. The owners were reluctant to accept this, given
the amount of affordable housing they were putting on
the site, but they agreed to the Council’s demands since
they ‘‘were worn down by this stage’’.
The fact that the developers reluctantly agreed to the
affordable workspace in the scheme is consistent with
the presentation of the scheme in the marketing leaflet,
where it was simply described as consisting of 47
residential units and 1 commercial unit (Kind &
Company, 2010), with no mention of the ‘affordability’
of units. Following an agreement to include affordable
workspace in the scheme, the developers claimed that
the Council did not help them to secure suitable tenants,
despite the S106 agreement referring to a list of
organisations that should be provided by the Council to
the developer. They insisted that the Council referred
only one workspace provider, Acme, who was not
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inward investment agency, Invest in Hackney, who put
two further names forward. Of these, Hackney
Voluntary Association expressed interest but was
unable to take the lease as it could not secure a grant.
Although the scheme was completed in 2008, by 2009
the developers had still not found suitable tenants. The
same year they sold the site on and the new owners were
not required by the Council to implement affordable
workspace as the six-month clause had expired.5 At the
time of writing, the commercial workspace was
occupied as a single unit by a building and maintenance
services company.6
In this case, it is clear that the developers saw the
provision of affordable workspace in its scheme as a
burden and the outcome has clearly been unsuccessful
from the point of view of delivering affordable
subsidised workspace. One can only speculate on the
factors influencing their perspective, but it appears that
the requirement to provide affordable workspace was
imposed on the developers relatively late in the planning
application process, after they had devised a scheme
with affordable housing providers, who do not have
commercial expertise. As a family run enterprise with
little track record of development, and no expertise in
either the residential or commercial development
sectors, they did not have the experience and/or perhaps
resources to respond to the Council’s requests
effectively. As the original owners of the site, their
interest was in securing the highest possible value for
the site and then selling on, retaining no ongoing
interest in the building from either an investment or
management perspective.
3.3. Inherited planning permission
Two of the developers of the case study schemes in the
research inherited a requirement to provide affordable
workspace in their schemes, through purchasing a site
which had the benefit of planning permission. Both
developers saw the affordable workspace policy as a
burden imposed upon them by the local authority and this
has undermined or looks likely to undermine the success
of the schemes. Again, the reasons for their perspectives
are considered below, as well as the factors that have
influenced their perspective.5 D Sheinman (2011) Well Street [Email], Message to Jessica Ferm,
25 January 2011.
6 Site visit, 22 January 2011.3.3.1. McCabe: Eagle House
Established in the 1970s, McCabe originally made
their name as housebuilders in Ireland, but now have a
UK portfolio and actively market themselves as
developers of a diverse project portfolio including
mixed use, commercial, industrial, retail, educational,
leisure, and healthcare (McCabe, 2012).
McCabe inherited the requirement to provide afford-
able workspace at Eagle House, when they purchased the
site in 2007 from the previous owners, which already
benefited from planning permission and a signed Section
106 agreement. The Director of McCabe claimed he was
unaware of the implications at the time of purchase:
When we bought this scheme, this is the document we
bought it on; it doesn’t actually mention affordable
workspace. It just says workshops. Does that mean it
can’t be offices?
The situation was made worse by the discovery of a
flaw in the wording of the S106, which implied that a
rent of £9.54 psf was both the rent to be charged by
McCabe to the workspace provider and the rent
chargeable by the workspace provider to its tenants.
McCabe were in discussion with three separate work-
space providers, but were struggling to sign a deal.
Under the terms of the S106 agreement, the workspace
provider would only be able to take on the space if the
developer paid all the additional costs of fit-out and
service charges. McCabe was unwilling to agree to
these terms since they would not normally pay for these
costs on their commercial space let at market rates and
therefore negotiations fell through. According to the
Director of McCabe, Hackney Council requested that
the space be advertised at this rent. ‘‘The way the
financial market is at the moment. . . it would suit me if I
could get a tenant there for £9.54 at the moment, to be
honest with you, because it’s a part of my building gone
that I do not have to try and get it rented’’. This suggests
that it was not the letting of space at a discounted rent
that was seen as the major burden for the developer,
rather it was the fact that it did not seem possible to sign
a tenant at all and there was a perceived risk the space
would remain empty.
On the other hand, there was an opt-out clause in the
S106, which stated that if they could not close a deal
within six months, following sufficient advertising, then
the workspace could revert to market rate (London
Borough of Hackney, 2006: Para 4.3.5). Following
unsuccessful negotiations with the workspace providers
put forward by Hackney, the Council insisted that the
developers advertise the space, which McCabe
approached reluctantly:
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advertise it again. I didn’t advertise it before because
we’re not ready. So I’ve got to advertise it and then if
the people come in and say the exact same thing, then
I’ve got to go back to Hackney and say ‘thank you
very much, I’ve done what I can and nobody wants it,
we’ll have it back please’.
The developers’ comments also revealed their lack of
knowledge of the local commercial market in Hackney:
So presumably one would have to advertise within
the borough. Where one would advertise in the
borough, I have no idea. Hackney Gazette? I don’t
know where else you’d advertise. But I’ll give it to an
agent, I’ll give it to Stirling Ackroyd who are being
taken on to market our commercial bit. . .
Conversely, he appreciated the aims of an affordable
workspace policy and the local authority’s aspirations,
and they were willing in principle to work with the local
authority to achieve it.
In principle it’s a reasonable scheme but it needs to
be sorted out and put into a proper format so that it’s
not as ambiguous as it is. See I’ve no problem putting
a painter in there or an artist or a poet or whatever
you put in there, I don’t know, it’s no problem to me.
But I’ve got to have my £9.54 at least. I can’t give it
for nothing.
Moorfields Eye Hospital, who were already com-
mitted to taking some of the commercial space in the
development, expressed an interest in taking the
affordable workspace: ‘‘I’m sure Moorfields would
love an extra 10,000 sq. ft. at £9.5400, but he emphasised
‘‘it’s not in the spirit of things really’’. So the impression
is that McCabe would like to appear willing and go with
the ‘spirit’ of the policy. However, additional comments
made during the interview indicated that they had no
motivation of their own to include affordable workspace
or small businesses in the development and the
affordable workspace was not seen as contributing
positively to the scheme overall.
Upon purchase of the site, McCabe made a decision
to co-locate the affordable workspace with the
affordable housing in the least desirable part of the
rear, retained building, claiming this was because there
were benefits of low service and maintenance charges
for both types of users:
If somebody’s going to come in at a £9.54 rent, they
don’t want to be in the middle of our tower where
their service charges are going to be colossal. If
they’re in the other building, then their service
charges are going to be reasonable. . .This raises service and maintenance charges as an
issue that could become a problem for the effective
implementation of affordable workspace policies,
especially if it is anticipated that the affordable
workspace would be co-located with commercial
workspace. In addition, this also highlights how
McCabe did not see the affordable workspace occupiers
as anchor tenants that are likely to attract other
commercial tenants or as a positive feature of the
scheme that could help to market the private residential
component. Rather the affordable workspace has been
placed away from the core of the development.
Furthermore, McCabe were reluctant to divide the
1000 m2 of space into ten units for small businesses, as
requested by the Council, because this was not
something that was stipulated in the S106 and is costly.
In this case, there are a number of factors influencing
McCabe’s perception of the affordable workspace as a
burden: the fact that they inherited the requirement from
previous owners and therefore did not witness the
planning benefits secured as a result; that the S106
agreement was flawed; that they purchased the site
based on calculations that assumed they would be
achieving market rents for all their commercial space;
and a lack of knowledge about the local commercial and
small business market. This meant that although they
sympathised with the Council’s aspirations to secure
affordable workspace, and were keen to meet the
Council’s requests to build a good relationship with
them, there was little motivation to make it work from
their own perspective.
3.3.2. Findon Urban Lofts: Richmond Road
Findon Urban Lofts are residential-led developers of
Richmond Road and have been described as a ‘boutique
developer’ (Young Group, 2008). It is a family business,
with its origins in Israel, specialising in developing
contemporary London based apartments, with com-
mercial components, in regeneration areas of London.
From their marketing material, including the webpage
and brochure for the Richmond Road development, it is
clear that the artistic heritage of the building, and the fact
that it was previously home to a gallery and artists’
studios, was central to the marketing theme. On the
website, the development was given the name, ‘Arthaus’.
It is described as having ‘‘a unique creative heritage’’
being a former art gallery, and that its ‘‘creative
reputation is set to be enhanced by this very individual,
mixed-use development’’ (Union Developments, 2009).
The extract from the developers’ online brochure also
refers to its previous use as an art gallery and that it has
‘‘been redesigned to provide artists and designers with
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creativity’’ (Union Developments, 2009).
When the Chief Executive was interviewed, a
different picture emerged. The requirement for afford-
able workspace was something the developer inherited
from the previous, consented scheme, which was
granted permission on appeal. Contrary to the
impression that artists’ studio space would be central
to the development, he insisted that Space Studios, who
were the previous tenants in the building and who were
expecting to be guaranteed replacement workspace,
would not be tenants in the new development. He
argued that the S106 is fundamentally flawed in that it
allows the developer to let the space to an intermediary
– the workspace provider – who is then not obliged to
sub-let the space at subsidised rates, rather they can then
sub-let it at market rent. Unless local authorities are
willing to offer concessions – for example allowing the
developer to build an extra storey in return for providing
affordable workspace – then he insisted he will not
provide it. Furthermore, he emphasised that the
developer needs to buy into the concept, in order to
make it work:
If they want a developer to actually want to give them
affordable workspace, they need to give something in
return. . . because it’s too management intensive. If
the developer doesn’t buy into it, who’s going to
make it work?. . . Say I have 15 tenants, altogether
paying me £30,000 a year. And I need to manage
them and the mess that they create. Can you imagine
me having this whole hassle? I might as well leave it
empty. The management probably costs me half .
The Chief Executive was unapologetic about the
profit-making motives of his company: ‘‘My ethos is
just to make money. So I’m a total greedy developer’’.
Contrary to the impression given in the marketing
material, the commercial component of the develop-
ment is predominantly to be a Grade A office block,
with rents of approximately £30 psf, significantly
higher than any other offices in Hackney. He
emphasised that he works on the assumption of very
high profit margins, even if he is required to show lower
margins to comply with policy.7 ‘‘So all the day I’m
busy manipulating figures. That’s what I do all the time.
Showing that the construction costs are higher and my
sales values are lower’’.7 In order to show compliance with the London Plan’s affordable
housing policy, developers are required to show their development
calculations by using the GLA’s affordable housing toolkit.This is undoubtedly the starkest example of how
developers and local authorities need to work together
with a common purpose if affordable workspace is to be
delivered effectively. Imposing a requirement on a
developer who has no incentive to implement affordable
workspace and does not believe in its purpose is
unlikely to lead to results. In this case, the affordable
workspace was seen as an imposition by the local
authority on the developer, who had inherited the
requirement from a previous planning permission.
Rather than reluctantly accept the requirement, this
developer chose to exploit the legal loopholes and avoid
delivering affordable workspace. This approach was not
apparent in the original marketing material for the
scheme, which gave the clear impression that it has been
designed with the artists’ studios at its core. The
developer was therefore opportunistically exploiting the
concept of affordable workspace for the company’s own
benefit, with no intention to deliver the outcome
required by the local authority.
3.4. Summary of findings and reflections
The summary of findings (see Table 2) illustrate the
relationship between developer type, the origins of
affordable workspace (A/W) proposals, the developers’
perspectives (gleaned from interview as well as
evidence such as the integration of A/W into scheme
design, and whether or not it featured in the developers’
planning statements and marketing materials), and the
outcome of the development (whether a workspace
provider was secured and subsidised workspace
delivered). The findings clearly show that it is not
possible to generalise how developers (as a unified
category) perceive the policy. Rather, there is wide
variation between developers in their attitudes and
approaches to delivering affordable workspace. It is also
difficult to predict what a developer’s perspective on
affordable workspace will be based on their character-
istics. There are, however, some commonalities
between developers’ motivations, which inform their
attitudes on particular case studies, and these will be
explored.
In terms of the wide variation of perspectives, two
developers saw the wider regenerative and place-
making opportunities of providing affordable work-
space, and two saw it only as a burden. The remaining
six fell in-between, seeing the provision of affordable
workspace within their schemes primarily as a tool to
secure planning permission. Within this group, there
were some who – over time – came to see that there































Summary of findings on developers’ perspectives.
Developer Type Origins of A/W
proposals
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were not viable for other uses. There were others who
proposed affordable workspace in order to secure
planning permission, but never delivered subsidised
workspace in the spirit of the policy.
Although there is this wide variation, developers
were commonly shown to be driven by (1) obtaining
planning permission, (2) development viability, (3)
marketing or achieving sale of the residential compo-
nent of their schemes, and (4) their reputation and
relationship with the local authority. The question is
how do these underlying motivations translate into
different perceptions of affordable workspace in the
chosen case studies? The findings show that the way the
affordable workspace proposal emerged has some
correlation with developers’ perspectives. For example,
if a developer initiates the affordable workspace
proposal, or the requirement is made clear early on
by the local authority, then the developer is more likely
to see it as an opportunity. This is because it has the
opportunity to (a) have early discussions with the local
authority to understand how the proposal might help
them to secure planning permission, (b) factor in the
affordable workspace at an early stage into development
calculations, and (c) choose a workspace provider
partner that will complement the overall development
and enhance sales. Therefore, schemes that appointed
workspace providers and delivered subsidised work-
space were more likely to have been negotiated early. In
contrast, if the requirement emerges late in discussions,
or is inherited from a previous planning permission,
then the developer is more likely to see the requirement
as a burden and the outcome is unlikely to be successful.
Where enthusiasm for affordable workspace exists, it
was closely linked to the types of occupiers of the
affordable workspace; artists or creative workers. This
provides support for the hypothesis that developers who
embrace affordable workspace policy do so because
they believe that signals of creativity can generate rent
and revenues and that they are not simply reluctant
partners in delivering public good (Logan & Molotch,
2007). Findon Urban Lofts did use the concept of
affordable workspace extensively in their marketing
material, although they clearly saw the provision of
affordable (subsidised) workspace as a burden and did
not deliver it within the scheme at all. This suggests that
there is scope for developers to exploit the concept of
affordable workspace in terms of its signal to creativity,
in order to enhance sales, without the intention of
honouring its delivery.
It is more difficult to draw conclusions about the type
of developer and how this influences either itsperspective on affordable workspace, or the outcome.
This is because of the small number of case studies
considered in the research and the fact that affordable
workspace policy comes into play primarily on large
residential or mixed-use applications. Developers
therefore tend to be residential-led and there was only
one ‘local’ developer (previous landowner) – the others
operated at least regionally across multiple sites.
Therefore, conclusions cannot be drawn from this
research about the influence of the geographical focus
of the developer nor the developers’ stage of maturity –
although this does not mean that these could not be
factors. Some observations can be made about the
sectoral focus of developers. Although residential-led
developers were represented in all three categories of
perspective, there did appear to be some commonality
between the two commercial developers. In both cases,
the affordable workspace helped to achieve planning
consent and the developers put themselves forward as
the workspace providers for the schemes, showing that
they saw the opportunities presented by the provision of
affordable workspace in policy terms. However, both
were reluctant to allow the local authority to dictate the
terms of the S106; they were especially resistant to caps
on the rental levels and believe that the best way to
achieve affordability for small businesses is to provide
flexible accommodation and lease terms.
The final question is whether or not a description of
developer character – as ‘pioneer’, ‘pragmatist’ or
‘sceptic’ as suggested by Payne (2009) – is helpful here.
Certainly, describing some developers as pioneers
captures, for example, Telford Homes’ proactive
approach to accommodating affordable workspace
within their mixed use proposals. In terms of causality,
it is the developers’ character that led it to initiate
affordable workspace proposals. Those who saw
affordable workspace as a burden in their development
could also usefully be described as ‘sceptics’ and it may
be that these developers are inherently more cautious in
their approach. However, the case studies show that to
some extent all the developers adopt a pragmatist
approach, taking into consideration the four factors
considered earlier. Whether, in practice, they embrace
affordable workspace or are sceptical about it might be
also due to the particular circumstance of that
development, and the way the affordable workspace
proposal emerged. It might also change over time, as
they become more familiar with the policy and the way
in which they can design their development to
accommodate affordable workspace. Certainly, in the
case of Unite Group at Arundel House, the findings
show how this developer’s perception of affordable
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the council, and their experience of implementing it.
Thus, whilst they could legitimately be described as
more pragmatist on this occasion, they might well be
more pioneering in the future. A further distinction was
made by Goodchild and Munton (1985) between
‘active’ and ‘passive’ behaviour (in this case referring
to landowners, but could be applicable to developer
behaviour too). This helps to distinguish between
developers who are proactively incorporating afford-
able workspace in their proposals and helping to shape
policy (Telford Homes and Workspace Group), in
contrast to the majority, who are more passive and only
deliver affordable workspace when policy acts upon
them. Again, however, this fails to capture the dynamic
nature of developers’ attitudes and approaches towards
delivering affordable workspace, which could be an
interesting area for further consideration.
4. Workspace providers’ perspectives
In the 1980s and 1990s, the workspace provider
market in the UK was dominated by the public sector
and voluntary organisations (Chalkley & Strachan,
1996), but today it is much more diverse. It includes
many private operators, as well as a variety of not-for-
profit organisations, including charities and social
enterprises. At the same time, the public sector has
assumed a less direct role in the funding and manage-
ment of managed workspaces. However, its interest in
subsidising workspace as an economic development
tool remains strong, as illustrated by the emergence of
affordable workspace policies in planning documents.
The new policy context means that instead of one
party (the public sector) being primarily responsible for
the refurbishment of buildings, as well as their funding
and management, now there are three parties involved.
The local authority retains an interest through its role as
planning authority, the space is delivered by developers
through new build schemes (instead of refurbishment),
and it is then operated and managed by workspace
providers. In addition to its management role, the
workspace provider provides developers with the
specialist expertise required to deliver small business
workspace within their developments, as well as access
to a pool of potential occupiers (often on a waiting list),
providing evidence of demand and certainty for
developers. It acts as a bridge between the state and
the developer, providing access to a pool of tenants that
are ‘in need’ of affordable workspace and delivering
‘affordability’ on behalf of the Council.Thus, the workspace provider’s role is pivotal, yet we
know even less about them than we do about developers.
Through exploring their perspectives on affordable
workspace and their experiences of managing it, this
chapter provides us with some insight into what
motivates workspace providers and how their organisa-
tional models work. It explores the implications of their
organisational models for their perspectives on and
interpretations of affordable workspace, and how these
in turn influence policy outcomes, i.e. who are their
target tenants and are they delivering affordability?
These questions provide us with the crucial insight into
who is benefiting from affordable workspace policy and
allows us to reflect on whether or not policy is
supporting economic development.
This chapter is structured according to three
categories of workspace providers:
 commercial (Section 4.1),
 not-for-profit, catering for artists (Section 4.2),
 and not-for-profit, catering for small businesses
(Section 4.3).
The distinction between commercial and not-for-
profit is made because local authorities themselves have
made that distinction, and in some cases have requested
that developers partner only with not-for-profit work-
space providers. A further distinction between artist
studio providers and other managed workspace provi-
ders catering for small businesses is made since they
have different origins. The perspectives of the four
workspace providers that partnered with developers on
our case studies are complemented with a further four
workspace providers that are not partners in mixed use
schemes with affordable workspace.
4.1. Commercial workspace providers
This section features the only commercial workspace
provider in our case studies, Workspace Group. It is the
largest provider of workspace for small and medium
sized enterprises in London, and as a public limited
company (PLC) has a responsibility to deliver profit to its
shareholders. The implications of its business model for
its perspective on and interpretation of affordable
workspace, its target tenants, its ability to deliver
affordability and its view of affordable workspace policy
are considered. Two further commercial workspace
providers that were not partners in any of the case studies
are considered more briefly in this category in order to
draw comparisons and conclusions. These are Greater
London Enterprise Property, which caters to small and
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Company, which caters to voluntary sector organisations.
4.1.1. Workspace Group
Workspace Group was established in 1987 through
the privatisation of the former Greater London
Council’s industrial property portfolio, with only 400
tenants (The Wall Street Transcript, 2005). Since then, it
has grown to become the leading provider of workspace
for over 4000 new and small businesses in London and
the Southeast (Workspace Group, 2009). It has built its
portfolio over the years through the growth of rents
achieved on the management of its stock, leading to
improved valuations and the ability to acquire new
stock. By acquiring properties in areas of change, it is
able to achieve both rental and long-term capital value
growth (Workspace Group, 2009), thus it has little
interest in keeping its rental levels low for existing
tenants or retaining the status quo on any given property
in its portfolio.
Workspace aims to provide a competitive product in
terms of price, the quality of accommodation and the
nature of the lease (Workspace Group, 2009). Accord-
ing to the company’s Development Director, Work-
space’s target customers are small businesses with less
than 20 employees who are in their second stage of
maturity, i.e. about 4–5 years old. Although there are
some start-ups, Workspace does not market itself as an
incubator and does not provide additional business
support. Within the market, it sits between incubators
and serviced office providers. Workspace describes
itself as ‘no frills’; it provides simple basic workspace to
businesses that are conscious of their overheads. The
flexible leases also make its properties attractive to
young or lower turnover businesses. Workspace offers
three-year leases with the opportunity to break with
three-month’s notice. New tenants are required to
provide proof of identity and three month’s rental
deposit. No further criteria, personal guarantees or
business plans are required as a condition of entry. The
Development Director claims that these ‘‘easy-in, easy-
out’’ terms means that Workspace generally gets very
low debts; businesses that cannot afford to pay the rent
will leave and be replaced by a new business. This
business model works even in uncertain economic
times, when businesses tend to look for flexibility. This
was confirmed by articles in the commercial press
which confirmed that despite falling values and
difficulties facing small businesses in the recession,
Workspace Group survived better than most property
companies with commercial portfolios (The Times,
2009; The Telegraph, 2008).Wandsworth Business Village was acquired by
Workspace Group relatively cheaply at a time when
industrial uses predominated in the area. Since then,
land values have risen significantly providing an
incentive for the company to expand its role in property
development and upgrade the site. Redevelopment
provides an opportunity to attract higher quality tenants
and charge higher rents:
We had a site that was designated for employment
use. We had buildings there that were reaching the
end of their natural life. There were two ways
forward; one was to patch it up and hope for the best.
But eventually it drives itself down and from
attracting good quality tenants who are there
because they like the location and because it’s a
good image for them. . . you’ll be attracting tenants
who are there because it’s dead cheap. And they
generally are not the best types of tenants to have.
I’m not saying that you should ignore them, because
there’s a place for them, but the place is not
necessarily in a high value area like Wandsworth.
This shows that Workspace Group’s motivation is not
to provide the cheapest possible workspace to
businesses that are most in need. The fact that it takes
advantage of opportunities to increase its rental revenue
stream is consistent with its status as a public limited
company with responsibilities to its shareholders.
Although the planners required Workspace Group to
offer space in the new building to existing tenants
following the redevelopment, the Development Director
explained this is unlikely to happen in practice.
Businesses will necessarily have moved on to alter-
native premises during construction and are unlikely to
want to move again. Further, the rents will no longer be
affordable for these tenants:
Let’s make no bones about it. We’ll be taking rents
from let’s say £10 or £12 per square foot to say £20.
So, you know the types of tenants who will be paying
£10 to £12 will probably move to somewhere else
which we can give them which is also the same level
of quality and they’ll pay the £10 or £12 a foot. If you
then said ‘come back and pay twenty’. . . it may be
that we’re just not targeting those businesses
anymore, we’re looking at a different type of
business.
The redevelopment will lead to more expensive
workspace, displacing previous tenants and providing
an opportunity to upgrade the quality of workspace and
attract new, higher-value tenants, willing to pay higher
rents. The fact that Workspace Group is promoting the
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flexible, affordable business units’’ (Workspace Group,
2008) raises the important question: for whom is it
affordable? Affordability is a relative term; what is
affordable for some businesses (in this case high value
creative or knowledge based businesses) is not
affordable for others (the existing tenants).
In Wandsworth, Workspace Group was able to use the
existence of affordable workspace policy at the regional
London level to its advantage, helping it to justify
redevelopment of a site that was decreasing in value.
However, it only worked because the local authority did
not have a policy on affordable workspace that required
the developer to subsidise the workspace. In other
locations, such as Camden, Workspace Group has found
that the existence of affordable workspace policy in the
area is actually a threat to its existing operations. As a
commercial operator, it is not able to subsidise its
workspace, therefore it cannot compete with schemes in
the area that have benefited from affordable workspace
policy. Which leaves us with an important question: does
affordable workspace policy undermine the work of
commercial providers whose core business it is to provide
flexible workspace for small businesses?
4.1.2. Other commercial workspace providers
Two further commercial workspace providers were
included in the research. The first was Greater London
Enterprise (GLE) Properties, which is the property arm
of the economic development company, GLE Group,
owned by the 33 London boroughs. In general, it
operates commercially without public subsidy and has
developed over two million square feet of workspace
accommodating over 950 small and medium-size
business tenants (Greater London Enterprise, 2009).
In the case of Waterfront Studios, GLE’s largest
business centre in east London, the site was owned
by the public sector which secured £1m European grant
funding for capital works to add to GLE’s £6m
investment. The second was the Ethical Property
Company, set up in 1998 to lever ethical investment
into property. It raises capital through issuing shares,
which are reinvested into property; the buildings are
then converted to provide workspace for organisations
that promote social change, including the charitable and
voluntary sector, and social enterprises.
Both companies claim to offer affordability or ‘good
value’ for their tenants through the provision of good
quality flexible space with short, flexible lease terms and
cost savings through the provision of communal facilities
and services, co-location of similar organisations and
high occupancy rates. With a similar model and approachto Workspace Group, they offer value for money and
flexibility, rather than aim to provide workspace at the
bottom of the market. As commercial providers, they are
required to focus on profit and cannot subsidise space or
substantially undercut the market; this is the case
regardless of whether their tenants are businesses, or
charities or voluntary sector organisations.
Similar to Workspace Group, GLE Property does not
cater specifically for start-ups. At Waterfront Studios, it
focuses on more established businesses in order to
ensure income security, although it rents some space to
an incubator that independently provides business
support services. In November 2008, at the time of
interview with the manager of Waterfront Studios, rents
averaged £23 psf for business centre accommodation
and £8–9 psf for the light industrial units, and the
complex was 80% occupied. He explained it is always a
question of balancing occupancy and cost, therefore
future prices might drop in order to boost occupancy.
However, he emphasised that Waterfront Studios was
likely to continue to do well, even in a difficult
economic climate, since they have very few competitors
in the area and businesses are often looking for flexible
leases in uncertain times.
Does affordable workspace policy provide future
opportunities for either company? GLE traditionally
only gets involved in large stand-alone business-centre
schemes. They did consider partnering with McCabe,
the developers of Eagle House, but it was ultimately
unattractive to them as a business proposition. Firstly, it
was unclear from the S106 whether or not the
workspace provider could sub-let at a higher rent than
the price they pay for it. Secondly, the accommodation
consisted of ‘‘deep and dark space which will not
readily divide into smaller units’’ on basement or
ground level. Finally, they were not allocated parking
and there was no lift.8 They had also been approached
by developers who had been unsuccessful in securing
planning permission for large mixed-use schemes. One
of GLE’s consultants believed they were being
approached in order to act as broker between the
developer and the Council, due to their relationship with
the London boroughs.9 The Ethical Property Company
is perhaps even more constrained in its potential to
partner with developers on mixed-use schemes with
affordable workspace, given the high environmental
J. Ferm / Progress in Planning 93 (2014) 1–4928standards and specifications it is required to deliver in
order to meet its ethical property commitment.
Certainly, they have run into difficulties in the past
when they were offered space through a S106 contract
in a new building, but where there had been no early
consultation with them on their requirements for the
building and this proved costly to install at a later date.
The opportunity presented by affordable workspace
policies for both companies is therefore as yet unknown.
4.2. Not-for-profit artist studio providers
This section focuses on the artist studio provider,
Acme Studios, which was the workspace provider in
two of the case studies in the research, the Former
Lesney Toy Factory and 150 High Street Stratford.
Another large artist studio provider in London, SPACE
Studios, is also considered, in order to assess whether
generalisations can be made about artist studio
providers from the Acme case. In contrast to
commercial providers, not-for-profit providers often
have a remit to help certain sectors (in this case, artists)
and they may have access to grant funding, which can
be used to pay for capital refurbishment works. They are
not required to generate a profit and do not have
financial responsibilities to shareholders, therefore
arguably we would expect they are able to deliver
comparative affordability.
4.2.1. Acme Studios
Acme is a charity that grew from a collective self-
help initiative in the 1970s and has grown to manage
over 400 studios in 12 buildings throughout east and
southeast London (Acme, 2011a). The Director of
Acme explained that their philosophy has always been
to cut costs for artists and find ways to deliver studios
more cheaply than anyone else: ‘‘We are the cheapest of
the cheap’’. Their average inclusive rent for studios in
2011 was £9.44 psf or £197 a month for a 250 sq. ft.
studio (Acme, 2011b), approximately a third of
comparable average rents in the commercial sector
(Acme and Capital Studios, 2006). To be on Acme’s
waiting list, you have to be a non-commercial fine artist
deemed to need charitable support. The Director
acknowledged the difficulty of means testing and
how to determine whether an artist is ‘in need’ or not,
however, this is the charity’s stated aim.
Acme’s original model was described by its Director:
The old way of doing things was very much to find an
old building that no one else wanted, to throw a little
bit of money at it to convert it more or less okay intostudios – cheap and cheerful – and rent them out to
artists who didn’t pay a great deal of attention to
looking after the building. In any case it was only for
a five-year lease and in any case along came
developers and kicked you out anyway. And off you
went to find something else. And that’s the classic
story.
Acme claims that artists do the hard work to convert
difficult, hard-to-let properties, helping to reduce crime
and vandalism and acting as a catalyst for the
revitalisation of areas (Acme and Capital Studios,
2007:10). The problem with this model is the short lease
on these studios. Very quickly, developers come along
and take advantage of the creative reputation that
particular location has acquired thanks to the artists.
And the artists themselves move on to a new property.
In the last fifteen years, two significant shifts were
described by Acme’s director. The first is that rising
land values and tightened building regulations have
reduced the viability for artists to acquire old buildings
for refurbishment: ‘‘there’s no such thing as a cheap and
cheerful conversion anymore’’. This makes them
especially reliant on existing stock. However, across
London, only 9 of 89 studios are on a long lease, with
25% threatened through redevelopment (Acme, 2008b).
In addition, building required for the 2012 Olympics led
to the loss of a large number of studios. In 2001, Acme
alone lost 150 studios at Carpenters Road, at the centre
of the Olympic Park (Acme, 2008a). Acme’s argument
is that without identifying new, more secure ways to
acquire studio space, the charitable studio sector faces a
major threat. The second shift – ‘‘the Tate effect’’ – has
presented a lifeline for artists. Society’s perception of
artists has shifted from something to be ‘planned out’ to
something to be ‘planned in’. Whereas previously,
artists were displaced in the process of gentrification or
regeneration, now many authorities and developers are
seeing artists as central to their regeneration proposals.
As well as having cultural value, it is acknowledged that
they are good citizens, they have pride in the properties
and places they occupy, they provide jobs and bring
economic benefits. In short, they have become ‘‘some
kind of metaphor for social reintegration or social
regeneration’’. This has enabled a new form of
partnership working to emerge between developers
and workspace providers, whereby artists’ studios are
provided through the planning gain mechanism in
mixed-use developments.
The first scheme that Acme was involved in was The
Galleria in southeast London; a partnership with Barratt
Homes, providing private housing, affordable housing
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that each scheme stacks up financially without a grant,
although they have had access to Arts Council funding
which has helped to reduce their borrowing and given
them more freedom to consider other schemes. Since
then, Acme has partnered with developers on a number
of similar schemes, with their involvement facilitated
through the planning gain process, enabling them to
purchase a long lease on the studios from the developer
at approximately half the market value. Acme is
therefore gaining significant experience working with
developers to deliver affordable studios in mixed-use
schemes. They are also actively promoting the new-
build partnership model, which provides certainty and
affordability in perpetuity, as well as good design and
environmental specification, lower running costs and
space efficiency. Acme claims it represents one of the
few remaining options for artists:
If these partnerships are not realised the sector faces
both a reduction in the number of affordable studios
overall and many organisations will be forced to
relocate further from the centre.
(Acme and Capital Studios, 2007:5)
In both the Lesney and Stratford schemes, Acme was
appointed by the developer as the workspace provider
early in the life of the project, enabling them to
participate in the design of the workspace and negotia-
tions on cost. In both cases, Acme explained that they
calculated what they could afford to offer for the purchase
of the workspace based on the anticipated rental levels
from their tenants. At Stratford, they purchased 15
studios for approximately half the market value. In
addition, they provided the developer with a detailed
specification of the space that they required and worked
with the architects on the design. An early partnership
with the developer is one of Acme’s conditions for
involvement, not only because they require an input into
the design and specification, but also because their offer
to the developers needs to be in the context of helping the
developers to win planning permission.
There are many occasions where Acme has rejected
offers of space from developers. This tends to be where
Acme has been approached by developers who already
have planning permission for mixed-use schemes with a
few commercial units, but are unable to let the units at
market rate to conventional occupiers. These schemes
tend to be unattractive to Acme as they would normally
require a minimum of 10 units to make a scheme
viable and create the economies of scale required.
Furthermore, when developers already have planning
permission, Acme is usually expected to take the spaceat a marginally reduced rate and the developers are
rarely willing to sell a lease for the workspace to Acme
at a price that they can afford. In contrast, where
developers have been introduced to Acme from the
outset, understand the wider benefits that Acme can
bring to the scheme, and have based their calculations
on Acme’s offer, partnerships have been successful.
In Acme’s case, affordable workspace policy is
perceived as an opportunity to acquire good quality,
affordable studio space in perpetuity, whereas they have
historically had to rely on short leases in run-down
buildings that are threatened with redevelopment.
However, this perspective relies on an early partnership
being formed with the developer so that Acme has an
input into the planning application. For comparison, the
perspective of another large artist studio provider in
London was sought.
4.2.2. SPACE Studios
SPACE was established in 1968 by artists as an arts
and educational charity. It supports contemporary visual
artists primarily through the provision of studio space
and professional development. SPACE is London’s
largest artist studio provider, with studios across east
and southeast London. It has approximately 600 tenants
in 16 buildings, 10 of which are in Hackney. SPACE
studio’s portfolio underpins its business and activities
by providing revenue for a range of grant-funded arts
related programmes.10
In contrast to Acme, SPACE does not have an
objective to provide its artists with the cheapest space
possible. The Director explained that their most recent
customer survey showed that only a third of its tenants
considered price to be the most important consideration.
For the remaining two-thirds of tenants, the priority was
split equally between location and amenities. ‘‘There’s
no one model. Some people actually quite like central
heating and alarms and a reception and they’ll pay
decent money for that. Some people like to be near
Shoreditch and they’ll pay a premium for that. We have
got a building in Barking, but we can’t get people out
there even though it’s dirt cheap.’’ SPACE’s experience
is that their tenants tend to have a threshold of how
much they’ll pay rather than how much space they need.
Often they would prefer to take on a smaller space
rather than move somewhere else.
When looking to acquire new studios, SPACE
looks for buildings with good long-term prospects;
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spaces are preferable, given that there are cost
efficiencies associated with accommodating more
studios in one building. However, whereas SPACE used
to rely on capital funding from grant bodies to refurbish
buildings, this has now almost entirely dried up. This
means that they are increasingly moving towards
partnership working; partnering with developers on
mixed-use schemes being one such example. There are
two current schemes with developers in Hackney. One is
at Timber Wharf on Kingsland Road, where SPACE
approached Shoreditch Trust for assistance with the
capital funding for fit-out in exchange for a rent-share.11
The other is at Richmond Road, where SPACE was the
previous tenant in the now demolished building and they
are negotiating with the developer on taking space in the
new development.12 One of the problems SPACE is
encountering in the Richmond Road scheme is that they
were never named as the workspace providers on the
Section 106 agreement. When the previous owners sold
the site upon securing planning permission, the new
developers were not legally required to involve SPACE.
If negotiations with developers on mixed-use schemes
are successful, the Director of SPACE acknowledged that
this model provides opportunities to secure some
affordability for a short period (in the case of Richmond
Road only five years). Apart from the short length of the
lease, there were other problems for SPACE. Developers
tend to want clean and quiet tenants: ‘‘I remember at
planning appeal they were talking about how they’d like a
certain type of artist, who maybe worked off laptops or
video – as opposed to people with paintbrushes and
messy materials. If you’ve got shared access with a posh
apartment block, they won’t be particularly happy’’. As a
result, the workspace tends to be located in the least
desirable part of the building: ‘‘they tend to tuck you in
the back areas, which are by the bins, by the plant and
with no light. The bits that they can’t let commercially. . .
taking the bits of the property that have the most security
risks’’. In the case of Richmond Road, the Section 106
agreement did not specify the size of the units or where in
the building they should be located.
In terms of future opportunities, SPACE is looking at
the acquisition of some long leases and freeholds. The
recession, accompanied by company closures and11 This scheme did not secure affordable workspace through the
Section 106 process and therefore was not included in the Hackney
case studies analysed.
12 SPACE studios was not named as the official workspace provider
in the case study analysis for Richmond Road since negotiations were
still underway at the time of research.abandoned office blocks, once again provided them
with the potential to acquire new properties. They are
also working with the Adam Smith Institute to improve
the profile of live-work: ‘‘we should really be dealing
with live-work because that’s what people really want
because they can’t afford two sets of rent. If you want a
critical mass of artists up there [in SPACE’s new scheme
in Barking] then they should be living there too.’’
SPACE has a similar remit to Acme: it is a not-for-
profit charity set up to provide studios for artists.
However, there are some important differences, which
suggests caution needs to be taken not to assume that
their objectives are the same and that they will
necessarily deliver the same outcome. Whereas Acme
explicitly aims to cater for artists ‘in need’, SPACE’s
remit is much wider. Whereas Acme aims explicitly to
provide the cheapest possible space for its tenants,
SPACE has a broader portfolio and the requirements
will differ from property to property. Whilst Acme
makes the claim that the new model of partnering with
developers on mixed-use schemes is a lifeline for them
and there are very few other opportunities available,
SPACE is actively pursuing acquisitions of properties
left empty following the recession. Acme is taking a
much more proactive approach to the opportunities
provided by new affordable workspace policies,
whereas SPACE is being more cautious and still
pursuing other avenues.
4.3. Not-for-profit workspace providers for small
businesses
The final category of workspace providers are the
not-for-profit providers catering to small businesses.
Two workspace providers in the case studies fell into
this category: Shoreditch Trust (Canalside Works and
Adelaide Wharf) and Centa Business Services (Arundel
House). In this category, it is interesting to consider
commonalities and differences between both commer-
cial workspace providers and the artist studio providers.
A final comparison is made with a not-for-profit
workspace provider that is not involved as a partner in
mixed-use schemes with affordable workspace, namely
Hackney Cooperative Developments.
4.3.1. Shoreditch Trust
Shoreditch Trust was set up in 2000 to deliver a ten-
year £60 million New Deal for Communities (NDC)
regeneration programme in Hackney. Towards the end
of the Government’s funding, the Trust focused on
acquiring property assets in Hackney, which was
rapidly gentrifying, in order to secure community
J. Ferm / Progress in Planning 93 (2014) 1–49 31facilities and develop an asset base and on-going source
of revenue for the Trust and its projects (Frith, 2004). By
2011, the organisation was managing over 20 properties
for a range of uses, including four properties with
affordable workspace (Shoreditch Trust, 2011). Prior to
the termination of Government funding, the emphasis
on Shoreditch Trust’s website was on its succession
strategy and long-term sustainability:
In order for the Trust to continue its activity beyond
2010 . . ., the Shoreditch Trust Board developed a
succession strategy that includes social enterprise. . .
to increase its range of assets which provide an
independent source of revenue for the Trust that will
help support its community goals way beyond 2010.
(Shoreditch Trust, 2008)
Shoreditch Trust’s funding context and its need to
secure a long-term sustainable revenue source is not
compatible with significantly subsidising workspace.
Rather it suggests it would have an interest in charging
market rates for business space. The two case studies of
Canalside Works and Adelaide Wharf explore this
issue.
For Canalside Works, the Shoreditch Trust and City
of London Corporation launched a press release in 2007
describing it as ‘‘first-rate but affordable move-on
space’’ and that they anticipate the space will appeal to
creative enterprises and financial services sectors who
currently struggle to find appropriate space in the City
fringes (City of London, 2007). The Shoreditch
Property Company website stated that Canalside Works
‘‘is designed to cater for the needs of expanding firms in
the creative sector’’ (Shoreditch Property Company,
2008a). The initial take-up rate was slow with two
tenants occupying the twelve units a year after the
launch. The first tenant was a high profile fashion
designer, Roksanda Ilincic, who has a relatively high
turnover, has been operating for many years and has
several employees. In this case, the company was
required to provide three years of accounts and a
business plan in order for it to be approved as a tenant.13
Such terms would make it difficult for a start-up to take
space there, suggesting that Shoreditch Trust was
targeting the higher end of the market.
The affordability of the units is questionable. As the
Director of the Shoreditch Trust stated: ‘‘it was the
initial intention that this was to be an affordable
workspace development, but what happens in practice is
that you have to go with the market.’’ He indicated this13 Personal communication, Roksanda Ilincic, 1 July 2008.meant charging about £15 psf. Affordability is clearly
something that the scheme has struggled with. The
Head of Regeneration at Hackney Council confirmed
these problems:
Well they were looking for £20 psf at one point. Now
when that scheme was thought through originally,
the market was very strong. And the problem with
that is that they’re relying on high rents and it’s not a
high rent location. . . And I remember [the Director
of Shoreditch Trust] said to me they were asking for
£17 or £18 psf and I said ‘you’re still a bit off the
beaten track there’. So it doesn’t entirely surprise me
that they haven’t managed to let it. It’s just too
expensive.
The European Grant enabled them to purchase a
property in a location that would not have been
attractive at the time as an office/studio location on the
open market. The aim was to use the relative
affordability of the units to attract tenants, which in
turn would create a critical mass and attract further
tenants. However, the Property Director explained that
location is an issue:
The problem is primarily the location. Most potential
tenants say they love the space but it’s not ideal for
clients who are visiting as it’s so inaccessible. But
now the restaurant has opened on the ground floor
and the basement unit has been sold on a long lease
to a photographer. So, we’ve got him and Roksanda
[Ilincic] and the restaurant. So hopefully now it will
take off. And in two years, we’ll get the tube.
Indeed, by early 2011, the scheme was fully
occupied with a range of tenants, mostly creative
businesses, with one voluntary organisation, one charity
and a social enterprise. So their risk paid off.
For Adelaide Wharf, the online publicity stated that
the workspace is ‘‘affordable’’ and targeted at ‘‘start-up
creative and design enterprises’’ (Shoreditch Property
Company, 2008b). However, the Trust’s Property
Director revealed a problem with the economics of
the scheme at the time of negotiation on the lease and
the resulting affordability to end tenants. He explained
that once the space is delivered by the developer to
‘shell and core’ standard, the responsibility for
additional on-costs fall to the workspace provider.
Although the S106 agreement specified a lease rent to
the workspace provider of only £1 psf, in addition to this
Shoreditch Trust would need to repay the loan obtained
to fund the estimated £200,000 fit-out, as well as pay a
£3 psf service charge to the head landlord and costs for
maintenance and utilities. He estimated that with a lease
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£95,000. Assuming the net floorspace is 5500 sq. ft., the
charge to tenants would be £17.27 psf, but that with
management costs included, ‘‘it will be considerably
higher’’. This would mean charging higher than the
average market rents in that location. Following these
estimated calculations, the Shoreditch Trust managed to
negotiate a longer lease on the workspace of 15 years
and decided to put grant funding into the project:
The only way that we managed to make Adelaide
Wharf work in the end was to put a lot of NDC grant
into it to cover capital costs and fees. As a
commercial venture, we just didn’t think it would
work at all.
However, rather than use the grant to make the
workspace more affordable for its tenants, it was used to
increase the specification of the fit-out from an initial
fit-out cost of £200,000 to a final cost of £500,000.
Even if you did a really basic fit-out, the rents we
would have to charge would be beyond market rents
in that location. But of course, now that all the
capital costs are paid for through the NDC grant, we
can make it work and make it profitable.
The Property Director explained his decision to
spend the grant funding on a higher quality fit-out:
It is going to be a very stylish fit-out. We’re aiming it
at a very particular section of the market, which is
tenants who want a desk space primarily, who want
to be in that sort of environment; people who perhaps
work at home at the moment, who would be attracted
by somewhere really nice to work, where they can
interact with like-minded people.
To find appropriate tenants, he appointed a con-
sultant who has ‘‘the most fantastic range of contacts in
the arts and design world.’’ However, in the year or so
between the initial estimated calculations (February
2007) and the point at which the workspace is ready for
occupation (July 2008), the estimated rental to end
tenants had increased substantially:
The rental is now likely to be about £70-80 a week.
For that, tenants get quite a high quality environ-
ment, desk space, storage, bike storage, broadband
and telephone, office facilities and generous meeting
space, showers. You can get cheaper space – there is
a similar scheme in Dalston for £50 per week but it is
‘horrible’.
One of the possible reasons for this further increase
in rental costs is that the Shoreditch Trust brought in anadditional partner on a profit-share arrangement in order
to run the marketing and manage the lettings. In this
case, the Shoreditch Trust is simply the head lessee,
taking responsibility for the original fit-out and
negotiations with the Council and developer, but
retaining a minor day-to-day role.
Shoreditch Trust’s Property Director acknowledged
that they would not be the choice of workspace provider
if the objective were purely affordability: ‘‘There may
be someone out there who could possibly have done a
really cheap fit out, perhaps someone like Space
Studios, but that’s probably the best that the Council
could have hoped for’’. Therefore, it is clear it is not
geared up to, or interested in, delivering workspace at
the bottom end of the market; the main reason being the
type of tenant it is seeking to attract and the quality of
workspace it perceives is required in order to achieve
this.
Even though the Shoreditch Trust is a charity, it has
similar aspirations to profit-making organisations in its
approach to risk and long-term revenue. It acquires sites
in run-down areas, with a view to making a long-term
profit once values increase. However, the Property
Director acknowledged this was a risky strategy for a
charity:
I mean you’re always sort of second guessing the
market, I suppose. That’s why property developers
get big returns when they get it right, because they
take big risks. We’ve got that issue now with these
development sites. We’re sort of banking on the fact
that if we develop them out now, in two years’ time
the economy will be stronger. But it’s a fairly risky
business for a small charity like us. So we need to be
very careful.
Although Shoreditch Trust is one of Hackney’s
preferred workspace providers and one it recommends
to developers through its affordable workspace policy,
the Trust’s objectives to generate a healthy return on its
investment and on-going revenue for the Trust are at
odds with the delivery of either subsidised workspace or
workspace at the bottom end of the market for small
businesses in Hackney.
4.3.2. Centa Business Services
Centa Business Services is a social enterprise
providing business advice and support to start-ups
and micro businesses in central London. It has no
liabilities to shareholders but has to demonstrate to its
funders how it invests its profits. Until 2008, Centa was
funded by the London Development Agency (LDA), but
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2008. Centa has now turned to property management as
a way of funding its core business advice work. Whereas
previously, the ratio of Centa’s work on business advice
and property management was approximately 70:30,
now it is 20:80.
All enterprise agencies are in trouble; the only ones
who will survive will be those who have property
portfolios.
(Business Development Manager, Centa Business
Services)
Although start-ups and micro businesses form the
core of its business support work, Centa relies on
established businesses as anchor tenants for its work-
space schemes, in order to make its business model
work. Centa relies on the business advice and support
network it has built up in order to fill the workspace in
its schemes. It manages four properties providing
workspace for small businesses – three in Kings Cross
and our case study, Arundel House in Hatton Garden. In
Arundel House, Centa’s Business Development Man-
ager explained that the majority of the 32 units are being
taken by established businesses, whose existing pre-
mises may be threatened or unsuitable and who are
attracted by the networking opportunities possible at
Arundel House. He claimed ‘‘there is a real buzz about
the place’’ as businesses recognise the opportunity and
value for money provided at Arundel House, which will
be the largest and newest building in the area housing
jewellery manufacturers. ‘‘Most of the units were
signed up before we had even signed on the head lease’’,
he claimed, suggesting that Centa would take on
another building in the area if the opportunity arose
‘‘because I reckon I could fill it’’.
Centa was initially charging between £14–32 psf for
space at Arundel House. It does not set out to provide
affordable workspace per se, rather it is prepared to limit
the amount of rent charged to its tenants since this ‘‘fits
in with our business support model’’. Ultimately,
however, its purpose and motivation for managing a
property portfolio and providing workspace is to fund
its on-going business advice work.
The timing of the first interview with Centa’s
Business Development Manager in October 2009 meant
that it was possible to obtain a view on the impact of the
recession on their operations. Three points were made.
First, workspace providers were finding it difficult to
borrow money from banks to fund fit-out. Thus, the
previously dominant model, where the developer is
required to complete the workspace to shell and core
specification, with the responsibility for fit-out thenfalling to the workspace provider, was not working
anymore. In order for Centa to be interested in bidding
for the contract at Arundel House, they required the
developer to fit out the workspace to an agreed
specification and for this to be tightly controlled
through the S106 process. Second, the recession meant
that many landlords were left with commercial space
they were unable to let and were therefore keen to sub-
let to a third party who would take the head lease and the
responsibilities associated with it, often at peppercorn
rent. This led to an increased availability of cheap space
available on the market to workspace providers. The
final point was that rents were being slashed so
significantly that tenants were able to find high quality
serviced office accommodation at the same price as the
run-down property they were occupying. Centa lost
tenants from its existing business centres as a result.
Centa’s perspective on affordable workspace therefore
was adjusted through its experience operating in the
middle of a recession. Whereas previously affordable
workspace policy might have offered a welcome route
to securing premises for its tenants, the recession both
created problems with this model and offered other
alternatives.
4.3.3. Hackney Cooperative Developments
The final workspace provider considered in this
category is Hackney Cooperative Developments (HCD),
which was not a partner in any of the case studies, which
is considered here to highlight some interesting issues
with respect to operating affordable workspace. HCD
provides workspace for over 50 local businesses,
voluntary organisations and community groups across
six premises in a northeast London neighbourhood,
Dalston. Its premises include basic office/workshop units
and shop units, plus 10 small kiosks. Priority is given to
start-ups and black and minority ethnic businesses and
voluntary sector organisations (Hackney Cooperative
Developments, 2009).
HCD started in 1982 as a cooperative social
enterprise built on a cooperative housing model. The
Chief Executive of HCD explained how the way they
acquire properties has changed significantly:
Through the 80s and some of the 90s, you could pick
up commercial property very very cheap. And you
could also get significant grant, either central
government or later on European, to renovate these
places. And then if you have a not-for-profit
constitution like us, then you can rent out at the
bottom of the market. But obviously that situation
has changed now. . .because what we saw was a
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area, basically chasing profits that could be made on
the price of housing more than anything else. And
secondly an attenuation on public sector capital
grants.
These days, he explained, the model is to acquire low
market-value premises, where possible, and finance the
capital works through a mixture of public grant funding
and private finance. Although private finance is
becoming easier to access, HCD has estimated that
they need to attract 70% public funding in order to be
able to obtain a loan for the remainder. Since capital
funding is now so rarely available, HCD is not currently
acquiring new sites. But it is not necessarily attracted by
the opportunity provided by affordable workspace
policy. This is partly because it does not have ambitions
to expand substantially beyond its current focus in
Dalston, and partly because it does not believe in
subsidising its workspace. Its interpretation of afford-
able workspace is to deliver space at the bottom of the
market, generally between £7 and 9 psf. It achieves this
by doing very basic fit-outs or providing very small
units. However, the Chief Executive believes it is not in
its tenants’ interests to undercut the market since it
makes it difficult for them to make the step up when
they want to expand:
For most of the businesses, the policy has been to say
that it would be a positively bad thing to actually
really go way below market rent because there are
two real arguments against that; one of which is that
you create a relatively unrealistic situation for that
business, which is that the moment it has to expand
and has to move out, it suddenly finds that the world
outside is an impossibly steep hill to climb and that
they’ve been sort of coddled. That’s one disadvan-
tage. And the other is that actually if you’re using
public funding and you’re trying to offer something
of this sort to a wider population, then there does
come a situation whereby if there’s no move on or no
through-put, then you’ve offered this great deal to a
very few people, but after that. . . They’re the lucky
ones and then there’s a justice and equality issue that
comes into the picture.
HCD finds this is often a problem with the tenants of
the ten small kiosks; they find the financial leap to
acquiring standard sized premises on the High Street too
high. As a result, the turnover of tenants is not as high as
HCD would like, since they are only then able to offer
this opportunity to a small number of start-up
businesses.Fundamentally, however, the Chief Executive
emphasises that ‘‘there’s one very obvious thing and
that is simply that affordability does to a certain extent
come from being run by organisations that are not
extracting large amounts of profit. As a not-for-profit,
you’re not after extracting so much money out of it, so
you can rent for less for that reason’’. In addition to
simply being not-for-profit, HCD emphasises the
importance of commitment to its tenants, given the
intensive management required. ‘‘There are a whole set
of management issues associated with running afford-
ability, just in the same way as if you’re a social housing
management group, you’ve got a whole lot of social
issues to deal with and you’re constrained not to throw
people out immediately so you can’t be as ruthless and
as single minded as if you were in a private sector
operation. I mean that’s what we’re about, so. . .’’
Although HCD does not perceive affordable work-
space policy as a significant opportunity for them, the
Chief Executive believes there could be future merit in
bringing together the housing and business models,
possibly through the rise in popularity of Community
Land Trusts, facilitated by the recession and new
enabling legislation that has come into force. ‘‘That
might return us in a fairly subtle way back to a situation
more like the 1980s where land for affordable and social
purposes – social enterprise purposes – could be
obtained.’’ The property market crash specifically could
be a blessing in disguise, he argued, allowing once again
the acquisition of cheaper commercial premises.
4.4. Summary of findings and reflections
The overview of case studies in Section 2 showed
that affordable workspace policy is enjoying limited
success (defined by completed projects and appoint-
ment of workspace providers, as well as delivery of
affordability). This section has allowed us to dig deeper
and interrogate some of the reasons for this lack of
success, from the perspective of the workspace provider.
A summary of the findings is provided in Table 3. It
allows us to reflect on the relationship between
workspace providers’ organisational and delivery
models, their perspectives on policy, their interpreta-
tions of affordable workspace, their experiences of
delivering it, and their target tenants.
First, this chapter has shown that there are clear
differences in the perspectives on affordable workspace
between workspace providers that partnered with
developers in our case studies and other workspace
providers that were not (at the time of writing) partners
in ‘affordable workspace’ schemes delivered through
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saw affordable workspace policy as an opportunity to
acquire workspace, through a new model, after
experiencing difficulties with their traditional methods
of property acquisition or sources of funding. However,
they had a range of specific requirements if they were to
become involved: (1) the lease should be as long as
possible (in Acme’s case, they require a long lease of
125 years); (2) the space offered should accommodate
enough workspace to make it viable for the workspace
provider; (3) the space specification should be tightly
controlled and add-on costs to be met by the workspace
provider minimised; (4) the workspace provider should
be involved as early as possible in the development
process; and (5) the local authority should assist in
negotiating with the developer and demonstrating
demand for workspace. Workspace Group, the only
commercial provider in the case study schemes, had a
more mixed view of affordable workspace policy. On
the one hand, it provided an opportunity to justify the
mixed-use redevelopment of one of its existing schemes
in Wandsworth. In other locations, however, their
existing schemes are being undercut by other schemes
benefiting from affordable workspace policy and
therefore they have found affordable workspace policy
to be more of a threat.
The perspectives of other workspace providers who
did not see affordable workspace policy as an
opportunity help us to understand why developers are
finding it difficult to appoint workspace provider
partners. SPACE studios and GLE Properties had both
explored the possibility of partnering with developers
on affordable workspace schemes but to date had not
done so, either because the leases offered were too
short, or the space was unsuitable (too small or in the
wrong place) and without the right facilities. The
Ethical Property Company had little awareness of
affordable workspace policy, but its requirements to
invest ‘ethically’ could be difficult to achieve in
partnership with a developer on a mixed-use scheme.
HCD does not view affordable workspace policy as an
opportunity. It is a local provider and does not have
aspirations to expand its portfolio to other locations,
also it does not believe subsidising space is in the best
interests of its tenants.
Second, there was a clear difference between
commercial and not-for-profit workspace providers in
terms of their interpretations of affordable workspace,
which has implications for the delivery of policy
outcomes. Commercial providers are not able to offer
subsidised rents as they need to generate profits for
shareholders and expand their property portfolio.Instead, they claim to provide affordability for their
tenants by offering competitive market rents for ‘no
frills’ flexible space, with flexible leases and terms. In
contrast, we might assume that not-for-profit providers
are in a better position to deliver affordability as they
have no liabilities to shareholders and can recycle profit
within the organisation. However, the research showed
that this is not necessarily true and that the most
important factor affecting the way not-for-profit work-
space providers interpret and deliver affordable work-
space is not whether they cater for artists or small
businesses, but what their organisational objectives are,
and how profit from rental income is used to meet them.
Both artist studio providers interpret affordable work-
space as ‘subsidised’. However, only Acme aims to be
‘‘the cheapest of the cheap’’ and uses its subsidy to keep
costs as low as possible for its tenants. The small
business providers have a range of different interpreta-
tions of affordable workspace. HCD provides work-
space at the bottom of the market and achieves
affordability through its basic accommodation stan-
dards and providing small units. In contrast, the
Shoreditch Trust aims to provide high quality space,
but achieves relative affordability by investing in
cheaper locations. Centa Business Services believes
affordability is achieved by restricting the types of
businesses that can occupy the space, in this case
jewellery sector industries. Therefore, although Acme
and HCD cater for different types of tenants, both their
objectives are to provide workspace for users ‘in need’.
Income from the rental of the workspace is recycled to
keep rental costs low. In contrast, for Shoreditch Trust,
Centa and SPACE, their property management func-
tions generate profits that are re-directed to meet their
organisations’ wider objectives, rather than subsidising
the workspace itself. These workspace providers have
little incentive to subsidise workspace or undercut the
market and they operate more like commercial work-
space providers. In other words there is no guarantee
that an organisation will deliver affordability just
because it is a not-for-profit.
Third, the findings reveal that the types of tenants
benefiting from affordable workspace policy are either
artists or more established creative industries. Of the
workspace providers that were delivering affordable
workspace through policy, the target tenants were all in
the creative industries, ranging from artists (Acme),
jewellery designers and manufacturers (Centa), to high-
value creative industries (Shoreditch Trust and Work-
space Group). All the workspace providers in the case
studies targeting small businesses focus on established
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from Acme), their interest was to generate income
security by targeting established businesses and, where
possible, higher rental income. Although some of the
workspace providers not delivering workspace through
affordable workspace policy also targeted artists and
creative industries (i.e. SPACE, GLE Properties), it was
notable that HCD was not delivering workspace under
the policy, and it targeted start-ups, black and minority
ethnic businesses and voluntary organisations. These
findings question to what extent affordable workspace
policy is contributing to local economic development.
The findings also reveal the problem of establishing
criteria for businesses ‘in need’ of affordable work-
space. Of the two organisations claiming to provide
workspace for either artists ‘in need’ (Acme) or
businesses ‘in need’ (HCD), both acknowledge the
difficulty of formally assessing potential tenants.
Acme’s Director indicated that they do not means-test
their potential tenants but state in their terms of
reference that they should be visual artists deemed to be
in need of charitable support. As such, they are
excluding commercial artists, such as graphic designers.
In HCD’s case, it acknowledges the difficulty of
establishing what businesses are in need of charitable
support and therefore it limits its workspace to start-ups,
black and minority ethnic businesses and voluntary
organisations. HCD’s Director acknowledged the
problem of potentially subsidising uncompetitive
businesses and therefore HCD encourages a high
turnover of businesses, in order to ensure as many as
possible are be able to benefit from the support. In
Centa’s case, the Council restricted the category of
tenant that it was able to target through its S106
agreement, therefore it was the Council that determined
the businesses ‘in need’.
Finally, affordable workspace policy has arisen in a
climate when grant funding available to workspace
providers to finance capital building works is scarcely
available and it has offered an alternative model to
bridge the funding gap. However, the findings indicate
that affordable workspace policy is not effectively or
consistently replacing the need for grant funding.
Although an organisation such as Acme, has effectively
managed to take advantage of affordable workspace
policy and deliver schemes without additional grant
funding, this has only been made possible due to its size
and the property assets it has accumulated over time,
which allow it to borrow money against existing
property. Smaller charitable organisations do not have
that flexibility, and the experience of HCD has shown
that it is not able to take advantage of affordableworkspace policy, plus its size and lack of property
assets means it is difficult to secure loans and it still
relies on grant funding. Therefore it is the smaller
organisations that are least likely to be able to take
advantage of affordable workspace policy, and they are
the ones most likely to suffer from the lack of grant
funding. The other point to make is that grant funding it
is not always being used to deliver more affordable
workspace for tenants. For example, the Shoreditch
Trust used additional public subsidy to fund a higher-
quality fit-out, in order to attract more high-value
tenants capable of paying higher rents.
5. Conclusions and implications for policy
This research critically evaluates the contemporary
planning policy solution to tackling the problem of
affordable workspace adopted in London, from the
perspectives of the developers and workspace providers
delivering new mixed use schemes with affordable
workspace. It provides an insight into the working
practices of both actors, and their attitudes and
approaches towards the delivery of affordable work-
space through planning policy. It allows us to make
judgements about the way policy is working in practice,
and why. It also allows reflection on the outcomes of
schemes on the ground, particularly in terms of what
this means for future policy, not only in London but in
large cities of the developed world, where the public
sector increasingly relies on development by the private
sector to deliver much infrastructure and services.
5.1. Developers’ and workspace providers’
perspectives: Implications for success in practice
The overview of case studies in Section 2 (see Table
1) demonstrated that affordable workspace policy is
enjoying mixed success, according to the basic
measures of completion and occupation, and appoint-
ment of a workspace provider. The findings of this
research have shown that, where affordable workspace
policy fails, this can be explained by (1) the cooperation
and attitude of the developer, (2) the lack of partnership
between the developer and workspace provider, and (3)
flaws with the S106 system. Each is considered in more
detail.
5.1.1. The critical perspective of developers
Section 3 showed that the cooperation and initiative
of the developer is critical to the success of the scheme.
In several cases, affordable workspace was not
delivered in the spirit of the policy, or the developer
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workspace. In these cases, developers had one of two
perspectives: Either they saw affordable workspace as a
‘tool’ to obtain planning permission, but did not deliver
subsidised workspace in the final scheme; or they saw it
as a burden and found ways not to deliver. Their
perspectives could be explained in different ways: (i)
The developer could be described as ‘sceptical’ in
character (Payne, 2009); (ii) the developer is inexper-
ienced; and (iii) the requirement to deliver affordable
workspace either emerged late in negotiations with the
planning authority, or was inherited through existing
planning permission on the site. Either way, the process
by which affordable workspace emerged in the
proposals made it difficult for them to accommodate it.
In contrast, where schemes were successful, devel-
opers either saw affordable workspace as a genuine
opportunity or they saw the opportunity in terms of
obtaining planning permission, but over time they came
to see the wider benefits of affordable workspace in their
scheme. Their perception of it as an opportunity could
be explained in a number of ways: (i) the developer was
a ‘pioneer’ (Payne, 2009), and initiated the proposals
themselves, as well as the partnership with workspace
providers, (ii) the developer had previous experience of
delivering workspace for small businesses and per-
ceived the policy as an opportunity for their business,
(iii) the proposals originated with the developer or
emerged through early discussions with the local
authority, where it was clear that affordable workspace
would help them to obtain planning permission.
The success of affordable workspace policy is thus
clearly influenced by the developer’s perspective.
However, the factors influencing their perspectives
are varied. In some cases, it can be put down to the
inherent character of the developer. In others, to their
previous experience. Most influential, however, was the
process by which the proposal emerged. Although there
were some commonalities between commercial-led
developers with expertise in the small business market
in terms of their perspectives on affordable workspace,
further conclusions cannot be drawn from this research
about the relationship between the type of developer
(e.g. local vs. national, residential vs. commercial or
young vs. mature business) and their perspective. This
does not mean, however, that differences between
developers are not important. In fact, it may mean that
the differences between developers are so great and
varied, that it is difficult to draw conclusions about a
‘typical’ developer and its attitudes to planning policy.
This echoes the assertion that ‘‘since the development
industry is both varied and specialised, there may be nosingle development culture, but rather a constantly
changing spectrum of cultures as market, policy and site
constraints play out differently across time and space.’’
(Adams et al., 2012: 7)
This research also supports Adams et al’s (2012)
claim that there is no basis for the public sector to see
developers as ‘partners of the state’. Developers of
mixed use schemes were shown to be motivated by
common concerns – obtaining planning permission,
development viability, the sale of private housing in
their scheme, and their reputation with the local
authority. Thus they may be motivated to ‘work with’
the local authority to achieve these goals, but they are
only likely to cooperate if they can meet these
underlying objectives. Developers who do embrace
affordable workspace policy do so partly because they
believe that signals of creativity can generate rent and
revenues. In this context, they perceive arts organisa-
tions or workspace providers as valued ‘coalition
partners’ in simply ‘making more money’ (Logan &
Molotch, 2007: xx) and the type of occupier (i.e.
creative industries or artists) is critical to this
perception.
5.1.2. Partnering with workspace providers
Establishing effective partnerships with workspace
providers was critical to success, but has nonetheless
proved challenging in the majority of the case studies.
Developers spoke about the apparent lack of workspace
providers interested in partnering on mixed-use schemes.
The findings presented in Section 4 demonstrate the
varying perspectives on affordable workspace held by
workspace providers and suggest that there could be two
reasons for this. Either the workspace provided was not
considered ‘suitable’ by workspace providers for
occupation by their target tenants. Or there were reasons
why workspace providers might not see affordable
workspace policy as an opportunity for them at all.
For some charitable workspace providers, the
introduction of affordable workspace policy has
provided a welcome opportunity in a situation where
they are no longer able to access cheap properties to
refurbish in the way that they used to, due to cuts to
grant funding for capital works, rising land values,
competition from residential developers and tighter
legislation on refurbishment and building controls. It
has provided them with an opportunity to secure
modern, fit-for-purpose workspace at a subsidised rate.
However, they only saw policy as an opportunity if they
were able to influence the outcome of the scheme from
the design-stage and be an integral and early partner in
its delivery. Contracts are usually not specific enough to
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specification. Workspace is built speculatively and
delivered only to very basic ‘shell and core’ standards,
which workspace providers struggle to afford to bring
up to standard for small businesses. Residential-led
developers (who form the majority) tended to provide
the workspace element in the parts of the development
that are the least profitable or viable for residential use;
often on the ground floor or basement, with both
security problems and lack of natural light. For these
workspace providers, therefore, they have specific
requirements that must be met if they are to partner with
developers on affordable workspace schemes – require-
ments that are most easily met if they are involved early
in the scheme design and planning process and seen as
valued ‘partners’ by developers. For all these providers,
the type of workspace they took on, the price they paid
for it and the price they marketed it at to their tenants,
was dictated by their own organisational models and
objectives. In other words, they had to know what was in
it for them in order to be involved. They are not simply
‘agents of the state’, but operate entirely independently
and on their own terms.
On the other hand, there are many workspace
providers who do not consider affordable workspace
policy to have effectively met the gap left by the
withdrawal of grant funding. This is either because they
are small and local in nature, and unable to take
advantage of policy across multiple sites. Or, it is
because they see problems with the way policy operates.
For example they require larger buildings, where they
can achieve economies of scale, or do not believe in
undercutting the market as it acts as a hindrance to
establishing successful businesses in the long run.
Commercial providers, in particular, have an entirely
different perspective on affordable workspace policy,
largely because they have never relied on grant funding.
They are self-financing and their standard business
model is to acquire larger premises and offer network-
ing opportunities for businesses; and they do not accept
policy requirements to subsidise space. Although there
are examples of commercial providers using affordable
workspace policy to their advantage, in other instances
they perceive affordable workspace as a threat, as their
not-for-profit competitors are able to subsidise work-
space and undercut the market.
5.1.3. Problems delivering affordable workspace
through planning gain
There are flaws with using the S106 system to deliver
affordable workspace, even in economically stable
times, which are exacerbated during a recession. First,the system is overburdened and affordable workspace
competes with other priorities such as affordable
housing, transport and climate change for the same
pot of money. The evidence from this research is that
there are tensions between these priorities, with
developers keen to negotiate other S106 concessions
if they agree to deliver affordable workspace. These
tensions are likely to be exacerbated during a recession.
Second, there is a long time lag between the signing of
the S106 agreement and the delivery of the develop-
ment. Much can change in this time, including the
economic climate, the property market and the
individual circumstances of the developer. Thus, what
seemed feasible at the time of signing the agreement
might not be so when the scheme is to be delivered, and
there was evidence during the recession that developers
were returning to renegotiate the terms of the S106
(Marrs, 2011). Third, the cooperation of developers is
critical, something that cannot be controlled through
S106 and the research provides evidence that devel-
opers who view policy as a burden may take advantage
of ‘opt out’ clauses in S106 agreements, a tendency that
is again likely to be exacerbated in a recession scenario.
Fourth, the S106 contracts in these case studies were not
generally useful tools for the local authority to
guarantee affordability, in that they generally stipulated
only short lease terms and the cost to the workspace
provider not to the end tenant. Fifth, the S106 contract is
a passive tool and evidence from the perspectives of
developers suggests it will not achieve results without
additional input and resources from the local authority,
unless developers are driving the inclusion of affordable
workspace in their schemes. Finally, the use of the S106
system to deliver affordable workspace currently ties
workspace providers into partnerships with developers
and the mixed-use model, which might not be their
preferred modus operandi. This research provides
evidence that workspace providers are open to a range
of alternative models and that property downturns could
present opportunities to achieve more permanent
solutions. Section 5.3 discusses the implications of
these findings for future policy.
5.2. Is policy producing the desired outcomes?
The research considered two outcomes, to further
evaluate the success and impact of affordable work-
space policy. First, it considered whether or not schemes
delivered through affordable workspace policy can be
considered to deliver ‘affordability’. Second, it con-
sidered who is ultimately benefiting from affordable
workspace policy. The final section (5.2.3) then reflects
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economic development.
5.2.1. Affordability
The overview of case studies in Table 1 showed that
there was a significant variation in the actual rent
charged to end tenants, ranging from £10 psf to over
£20 psf. However, not all the schemes had been
implemented and occupied, and they were in different
locations, built to different specifications, making it
hard to compare and draw concrete conclusions. It is
important to note here that the concept of affordability
is relative, i.e. what is considered affordable to one
business would not be affordable to another. Also, an
‘affordable’ rent in a high value area may be considered
affordable only because it is cheaper than similar spaces
in the same area. However, it may still cost more than
comparable spaces in low-value areas let at market rent.
Another way to assess whether or not policy is
delivering ‘affordable’ workspace is to compare what is
created in the new development with what was
originally there. It was shown in the Wandsworth case
study that the redevelopment including affordable
workspace directly displaced existing tenants benefiting
from much lower rents, and the goal of redevelopment
was to increase the potential rental income stream from
the commercial element. In this case, a comparison
could be made as the original business village was still
mostly occupied at the time of the fieldwork. In other
cases where the redevelopment had not yet commenced,
it was not possible to compare since the existing scheme
was often vacant or partially vacant, with speculation
that the landowners might have allowed the site to
become vacant or fall into disrepair in order to increase
their chances of securing planning permission for a
change of use. In completed schemes, it was not
possible to obtain information on the rents paid in the
previous scheme on the same site.
This research has enabled further reflection on this
question by looking at the perspectives of the delivery
partners. It has shown that neither the developer nor the
workspace provider takes direct responsibility for
ensuring an affordable outcome for tenants. The
developer signs a S106 contract with the local authority,
which stipulates the rate at which the space can be let to
a third party (usually) for a fixed period of time. The
developer has little interest in what is charged to the end
tenant. It is left to the workspace provider to decide their
pricing strategy, as long as they can afford the rent
agreed in the S106 agreement. There is therefore no
control over the rate charged to the end tenant and it is
somewhat assumed that the workspace provider willdeliver ‘affordable’ workspace. There are problems
with this model and these assumptions.
Developers are often reluctant to accept S106
contracts that stipulate long lease terms for affordable
workspace. In this case, affordability can only be secured
in the short-term and workspace providers often turn
down opportunities to acquire subsidised workspace as it
is not always financially viable for them to invest in the
fit-out of workspace for the term of a short lease. It was
also revealed that there is potential for developers to
exploit the concept of affordable workspace – which
evokes creativity and an urban ‘buzz’ – for marketing
purposes without actually delivering it. A closer analysis
of workspace providers also revealed problems. First,
there is a lack of understanding from local authorities of
the on-costs that fall to workspace providers, to make
‘shell and core’ space fit for rental. Leasing the space to a
workspace provider for £1 psf sounds affordable, but it
might not be, depending on the additional costs that they
need to meet. Second, workspace providers are a broad
category including both not-for-profit and commercial
workspace providers. They differ greatly in their
interpretation of affordable workspace. Commercial
providers interpret affordable workspace as ‘no frills’
flexible space with flexible leases. Even within the
category of not-for-profit providers, there is much
variation in definition, including ‘subsidised’, basic –
or even small – workspace at the bottom end of the
market, providing workspace in cheap locations, or
simply ‘value for money’. In some cases, affordable
workspace is discussed more as though it were a typology
of space targeted at creative businesses than anything to
do with cost. Although local authorities tend to express a
preference for not-for-profit workspace providers, the
analysis shows that they fall into two broad categories,
defined by their organisational model: those whose
charitable aims are to provide workspace as cheaply as
possible or at the bottom end of the market for certain
categories of businesses (or artists) deemed to be in need;
and those who recycle the profits from letting out
workspace at more or less commercial rates to meet their
other charitable aims. These not-for-profit providers who
recycle their profits have been shown to behave more like
commercial providers, seeking market rents but claiming
to provide affordability by offering flexible space and
lease terms, allowing businesses to enter the market
easily and adapt according to their means.
5.2.2. Winners and losers
High land values in the inner city are only a problem
for businesses that have limited potential to maximise
productivity; otherwise the benefits of agglomeration in
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Businesses that are limited in their potential to maximise
productivity include start-ups, low-value manufacturers,
small family-run retail and service businesses, artists, and
young small businesses whose value to the economy have
not yet reached their full potential. Is policy benefiting
these businesses? The research has shown that the
outcome of affordable workspace policy is mostly
benefiting artists and higher-value creative industries
that are at least in their second stage of development. It is
not benefiting low-value manufacturers or small family-
run retail and service businesses, nor is it generally
benefiting start-ups.
A focus on the higher-value creative industries is an
outcome of the delivery of affordable workspace policy
through partnerships between developers and work-
space providers. Developers have an interest in
choosing a workspace provider that targets the types
of tenants that are likely to complement the image of the
development, help market the residential component
and be compatible with housing on an operational basis.
They are therefore more likely to partner with a
workspace provider that targets ‘clean and quiet’
creative industry tenants. Other types of workspace
providers are unlikely to be preferred partners. It is
therefore only a very narrow sector of small businesses
that are benefiting from affordable workspace policies.
The lower-value, lower-skilled enterprises including
manufacturing businesses are losing out, as well as
voluntary sector organisations; they are either displaced
directly or their accommodation choices are becoming
ever more restricted. Mixed-use schemes with afford-
able workspace are therefore resulting in rather
homogenous developments, with a limited range of
tenants and types of uses.
The fact that policy is not generally benefiting start-
ups can be explained by the business models of most
workspace providers. Unless a workspace provider is
focused specifically on start-ups as a niche, there is no
incentive or requirement for them to cater for these
businesses that, by their nature, offer a much less secure
income stream. This is naturally the case for
commercial workspace providers, but where not-for-
profit workspace providers depend on income from
rental of workspace to subsidise other charitable or
social enterprise aims, the emphasis is understandably
also on attracting financially secure tenants and
maximising the possible rental income from the asset.
The fact that affordable workspace policy is mostly
benefiting artists and higher-value established creative
industries, rather than start-ups, low-value manufac-
turers or small family-run retail and service businesses,has implications for its impact on economic develop-
ment objectives, which will be considered in the next
section.
5.2.3. Implications for economic development
The emergence of affordable workspace policies in
the UK took place at a time when the impact of public
sector subsidy of managed workspaces on economic
development was being questioned. An important aim
of this research was therefore to establish whether or not
this new mode of production of affordable workspaces
through the planning system is delivering economic
benefits.
First, the fact that affordable workspace policy is
generally not benefiting start-ups has important
implications for its potential contribution to economic
growth, and specifically undermines its ability to
promote entrepreneurship, ‘new ideas’ and innovation.
Instead, providers of workspace for businesses within
affordable workspace schemes are targeting more
established businesses in inner as well as central
London, which means that policy is essentially ‘luring’
tenants away from more established clusters with the
attraction of cheaper rents. This may generate greater
economic activity in the new location, but it will be
‘zero-sum’ (see Cheshire & Gordon, 1998) from a wider
perspective, i.e. it is unlikely to result in economic
growth at the regional, London scale. It may even
undermine existing clusters that are still thriving
naturally, potentially harming London’s broader
strength as a creative industry hub.
Intervention in peripheral locations may also not be
sufficient to create the critical mass required to
transform a location or create a cluster that will have
a natural life. Using affordable workspace policy to
encourage the location of new businesses to one area
over another is a challenge. The necessary time lag
between the formation and implementation of policy
means that it struggles to keep up with the pace of
reality, a problem that is exacerbated when dealing with
entrepreneurs and creative businesses that by their very
nature seek to be ‘ahead of the game’. It also assumes
that the cost of workspace is a key factor in a business’
choice of location and does not take into account the
other ingredients that are needed in addition to the
provision of physical workspace to influence the growth
of a cluster. In other words, it takes a ‘physical-
determinist’ approach to economic development. This
research was unable to investigate these issues due to
the infancy of the case studies – even those that had been
completed had had little chance to become embedded in
the local economy. Given the nature of the case studies
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catalysts in the formation of new clusters, which by
their nature would take time to establish. Despite the
unknown longer-term impact of affordable workspace
policies on clusters, the lack of benefits for start-ups
means we can conclude that the impact of affordable
workspace policies on economic development is limited
and we can speculate that it may in fact be counter-
productive.
Second, by supporting mostly creative industries and
generally the higher-value over the lower-value enter-
prises, policy is not supporting greater economic
diversity. Rather it is resulting in an approach of ‘picking
the winners’ on the basis that the creative industries are
growing in importance to London’s economy (GLA,
2008). In doing so, it prioritises economic growth over
economic progress and dismisses the benefits that lower-
value businesses bring to an economy and its people. The
fact that affordable workspace policy is not benefiting
lower-value businesses means that it is not helping to
prevent the loss of these uses, and the jobs that they
provide. One could argue that mixed use redevelopment
of employment land is happening anyway, and the role of
affordable workspace policy is therefore to ensure that
some of the commercial space that is re-provided is
targeted at other small businesses or artists, rather than
larger commercial occupiers, such as Tesco. This
argument might hold if it were not for the evidence in
this research that existing lower-value occupiers are
being displaced by commercial workspace providers to
make way for higher-value creative industry tenants that
create greater revenue, and that affordable workspace
policy is being used as a tool to achieve this. Furthermore,
the creative industry sector does not generate significant
employment, particularly for unemployed residents in
the more deprived areas of London (Evans, 2006, 2009;
Hutton, 2009; Pratt, 2009). This means that the policy is
not helping to provide opportunities for residents who
face barriers to conventional employment. Finally, there
is the risk that artists and creative industry tenants who
occupy these schemes will act as catalysts for further
waves of gentrification (Indergaard, 2009; Kunzmann,
2004). Thus the presence of creatives facilitated through
affordable workspace policy may in fact speed up the
process of displacement by higher-value uses, rather than
slow it down. Although this so-called industrial
gentrification might be welcomed by proponents of
economic growth, the displacement of lower-skilled with
higher-skilled jobs could have negative social conse-
quences.
This approach of ‘picking the winners’ is consistent
with the general trend in economic development policyaway from supporting inter-regional spatial equity
towards increasing the competitiveness of already
successful centres. It is an approach that needs to be
questioned in light of the late 2000s recession that had
its roots in the failure of the financial sector, upon which
London so heavily relies. However, there is evidence in
the post recession era that the UK Government is
continuing to pursue this approach rather than promot-
ing greater economic diversity. Although the coalition
government has pledged to create a more balanced
economy where we are not so dependent on a narrow
range of economic sectors, government support in the
form of subsidies and bank bailouts represents a
continued emphasis on the financial sector and the City
of London as the economic powerhouse of the UK, from
which economic benefits will trickle down (see Raco &
Street, 2011). To what extent confidence will continue
to be placed in the post-recession era on the creative
industries as a driver of economic growth in London and
other world cities remains to be seen.
In summary, policy is enjoying limited success in
terms of the number of schemes completed and
occupied as envisaged. Where policy does lead to
tenanted schemes, these are having limited impact on
the goal of economic development, even though there
might be other positive aspects to the schemes and
benefits for workspace providers and their tenants. This
undermines the justification for requiring developers to
subsidise workspace, especially in the light of evidence
that developers are using the provision of affordable
workspace to exact concessions from local authorities
and negotiate lower S106 contributions elsewhere. It
also questions more critically the broad trend in
economic development approaches to focus on the
collective provision of infrastructure and services in
successful economic centres. Importantly, these
approaches tend to ignore the issue of scale – the fact
that policies tend to operate at the very local level, in a
context where even local authorities within a city act in
competition. Thus where policies might appear to have
a positive impact at the neighbourhood level, in fact
their impact at the city scale is negligible or even
counterproductive. Furthermore, a relentless focus on
increasing competitiveness means that other social
objectives are ignored.
5.3. Implications for planning policy
This research has demonstrated that affordable
workspace policy is achieving limited success and will
not replace naturally occurring affordable workspace on
designated employment land that is being lost through
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or quality. Where it is being delivered, it is targeting
only a very narrow type of business and is not meeting
economic development objectives. These outcomes are
even more worrying in the context of policy changes as
a result of the publication of the National Planning
Policy Framework (DCLG, 2012) and the Govern-
ment’s subsequent introduction of permitted develop-
ment rights for conversion from offices to residential.
There are two key implications of these changes. First,
that the only other tool available to planning authorities
to promote affordable workspace – namely the
protection of employment land and uses – is being
further undermined. Second, the introduction of
permitted development rights removes the opportunity
for planners to require the provision of affordable
workspace in new developments, as developers will not
be required to apply for planning permission when
seeking to convert a commercial building to residential.
At present, the permitted development rights apply only
to offices (B1a) uses, not other commercial and
industrial uses, however the NPPF’s emphasis on both
housing delivery and the ‘regeneration’ that could occur
as a result of these relaxations suggests that this is a
policy turn that might well be extended in the future.
So what can be done? What is certain is that
affordable workspace policy cannot meet the gap left by
changes to employment land guidance. A much broader
approach is required, using a range of policy, legislative
and financial tools available, looking beyond the narrow
category of creative industries. It is not to say that
affordable workspace policy does not have a place and
certainly there are lessons to be learned from this
research which would improve its implementation in
order to extend its reach to those who really can usefully
benefit from it, for example artists. However, more
traditional ways of protecting employment land from
rising residential land values need to be able to operate
alongside such policy, acknowledging that they often
target very different types of businesses. In addition,
ways need to be found of supporting a much wider range
of small businesses, non-spatial solutions need to be
considered.
Existing policy could be improved to specifically
provide studios for artists and creative businesses,
although more work needs to be done by or for local
authorities on the benefits of supporting artists and
creative businesses through property subsidies, and the
fuzzy language of ‘affordable workspace’ should be
replaced by a more specific description of the typology
of space and who it is intended for. But if affordable
workspace policy is to have an impact on land values,which could act as a subsidy to workspace providers in
the same way as affordable housing policy works, then
there needs to be policy guidance and legislation at the
national level. If not, it will remain an ad hoc policy
applied inconsistently across local authorities, limiting
its overall impact.
The research has provided a better insight into how
developers and workspace providers work, what their
priorities and motivations are. The fact that developers
of mixed use are more likely to embrace affordable
workspace policy if the tenants are creative businesses
can now be acknowledged explicitly. But local
authorities must recognise the limited expertise of
residential-led developers and provide the support
required in order to establish partnerships with work-
space providers. Similarly, they need to acknowledge
the existing expertise and business models of commer-
cial workspace providers, working with them to deliver
flexible workspace according to their established
models, rather than requiring subsidised workspace to
be delivered. Efforts could turn to encouraging effective
and early partnerships between developers and work-
space providers. Workspace providers themselves are
best placed and motivated to instigate positive relation-
ships with developers, following the example of Acme
Studios, who have focused effort on promotional and
educational work with local authorities and developers.
Workspace providers should take the lead on deciding
‘what works’ for them and selling that concept to
developers as part of a positive proposal for develop-
ment, rather than being reactive and waiting to be
approached by developers or relying on local authorities
to ‘get their policies right’.
This research has also revealed the importance of
starting to differentiate between different types of
businesses at different stages of maturity, when
considering policy. In a sense, neither affordable
workspace policy or more traditional approaches to
the protection of employment land, provide targeted
support to particular types of businesses that are known
to need support through the planning system. For
example, this research has revealed that affordable
workspace is not generally benefiting start-ups. Rather,
there needs to be more targeted support through the
planning system for incubator organisations – who
provide targeted business support services for start-ups
– if our goal is economic development. There are also
other types of businesses that are not benefiting from
affordable workspace policy. Of course, not all types of
businesses face problems accessing workspace and
therefore this is not a problem for them. However, the
research that has been done in London (Roger Tym &
J. Ferm / Progress in Planning 93 (2014) 1–49 45Partners, 2006) indicates that the small to medium
enterprises (fewer than 250 employees) that were most
affected by accommodation problems were catering
businesses, followed by shops, then factories and
workshops, warehouses and finally offices. Given that
affordable workspace policy focuses only on the
provision of B1 space, i.e. offices or studios, it is
clearly addressing only a very small part of the problem.
The limitations of the S106 system as a mechanism
for delivery have been discussed. From a financial
perspective, the S106 mechanism leads to limited
benefits for affordable workspace. This is partly due to
the pecking order of priorities in relation to S106
spending, and partly due to an inherent problem with the
S106 mechanism itself, which is that it depends on a
healthy development climate to deliver. The key
limitation of the S106 system is that it taxes the
developer at the point of development, when profits
have not yet been realised. A better system would
involve imposing a property tax later in the develop-
ment cycle, when the development has reaped its profits.
The problem is that alternative forms of infrastructure
financing being implemented or piloted in the UK –
namely the Community Infrastructure Levy and Tax
Increment Financing – both also depend on a healthy
development climate to deliver benefits. An even braver
step would be the acquisition of (or equity shares in)
long-term land assets by the public or community
sectors, who would then be able to use the increase in
property values for public benefit (Edwards, 2008). This
would be in line with original recommendations in
Hackney’s evidence based studies to transfer the
ownership of the workspace in mixed-use developments
to workspace providers or to a local development trust
(Atkins, 2006; Ancer Spa, 2006). It should be
remembered that the now renowned clusters of creative
industries on the city fringe of London arose in times of
recession when resourceful entrepreneurs were able to
take advantage of low demand from other commercial
interests and cheap property (London Residential
Research, 2005). Efforts could usefully concentrate
on taking advantage of economic cycles to support
businesses and grassroots organisations in the acquisi-
tion of cheap commercial properties on long leases or
freeholds, when opportunities naturally arise. Recent
survey evidence from Brighton & Hove on the south
coast of England revealed that 90% of creative
businesses viewed the (sole or co-operative) ownership
of their workspace as the solution to the issues facing
their acquisition of suitable property (Hackett &
Massie, 2008). In acknowledging that one of the key
limitations of the S106 model is that it only impacts onnew stock, more efforts could be made by public bodies
to refurbish old stock, or make capital funds available to
enable others to do so.
The problem is that (as we have discussed) old stock
is often situated on employment land, which is
increasingly less protected from redevelopment. This
means that, not only are we impacting on the
availability of old stock on employment land for
refurbishment and reuse by creative industries, we are
also reducing the amount of naturally-available afford-
able workspace for a much wider range of businesses
and industries. If we are to move beyond supporting
artists and creative industries, we need to reinvigorate
our support for more traditional ways of protecting
employment land from rising residential land values.
The continuing trend by the national government
through the NPPF and subsequent legislative changes
to undermine local authorities’ ability to protect
employment land and commercial uses through the
planning system needs to be fundamentally questioned.
This paper has focused on spatial solutions to the
problem. However, other non-spatial solutions may be
more effective. For example, if businesses can be
supported to help them generate greater profits, through
perhaps coordinated efforts to help them access
international export markets, or expanding access to
micro-credit loans, the increased profits could then be
used to cover accommodation costs and help them to
locate in the most suitable and profitable location for
their business operations. The direct provision of
subsidised premises not only runs the risk of supporting
uncompetitive businesses, it also limits support to
businesses that use those types of premises provided in
mixed-use developments and it limits businesses’
potential location choices, which in itself could
undermine their success. Much could no doubt be
learnt from the ways other countries and cities are
tackling the problem, particularly European countries
that have a long history of supporting small businesses.
So, although this paper hopefully provides some useful
lessons from the UK’s experience to the international
community, we need to look outwards again for
alternative solutions.
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